PSBCA No. 6505


October 25, 2013

Appeal of

RYDER TRUCK RENTAL, INC.

Under Contract No. 1DVPLE-06-B-0001

PSBCA No. 6505                    

APPEARANCE FOR APPELLANT
Rebecca Thomason
Ryder Truck Rental, Inc.

APPEARANCE FOR RESPONDENT
Jessica J. Stringer, Esq.
United States Postal Service

OPINION OF THE BOARD ON RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO DISMISS

Respondent, United States Postal Service, moves to dismiss this appeal contending that Appellant, Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.  We deny the motion.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Respondent rented nine trucks from Appellant under Contract No. 1DVPLE-06-B-0001 (Contract)(AF 1, 4).
2. Respondent used the trucks at its Dominic V. Daniels Processing and Distribution Center in Kearney, New Jersey.  At the end of October 2012, Hurricane Sandy destroyed the nine trucks.  (AF 4).
3. The Contract’s Physical Damage clause provides that “Ryder will pay for all loss, theft or damage (‘Physical Damage’) to any Vehicle except where the loss or damage results from:  (i) the negligence or willful misconduct of [Respondent] . . . .”  (AF 1 at 5).
4. The Contract also provides that “[a]ccident damage (reported and unreported) should be recovered via a tort claim using Standard Form SF 95” (AF 2 at 42).  The SF 95 Claim for Damage, Injury, or Death form, Block 8, Basis of Claim, only requires the claimant to “[s]tate in detail the known facts and circumstances attending the damage, injury, or death, identifying persons and property involved, the place of occurrence and the cause thereof[.]”  The SF 95 does not require a contractor to identify the specific theory of recovery or the contract clauses upon which the claim is based.  (See AF 4 at 66). 
5. Appellant submitted nine SF 95 forms to the contracting officer, one for each truck.  The claims identified Hurricane Sandy as the basis of the claims and the market value for each truck.  (AF 4).
6. In nine separate decisions, the contracting officer denied the claims using the same language.  “I am denying Ryder’s claim because the flood damage to the vehicle was an Act of God and not negligence on the part of the U.S. Postal Service.  Hurricane Sandy was the largest[,] most destructive hurricane to hit New Jersey in over a century and caused a significant storm surge and heavy rains . . . .”  (AF 4).  The contracting officer did not state that he was denying the claims because he did not understand them.  Id.  Appellant filed a timely appeal of the nine final decisions to this Board. 
7. Appellant’s complaint letter, which is not in traditional complaint format, identifies the contract, the nine vehicles, the destruction of the nine vehicles by Hurricane Sandy, and the specific amount claimed for each vehicle. 
8. In lieu of an answer, Respondent filed the subject Motion to Dismiss (Motion) alleging that Appellant’s complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 

DECISION

The Board’s Rules of Practice provide that an appellant’s complaint should set forth in simple and concise terms each of its claims along with the dollar amount claimed.  In addition, an appellant should identify the contract clauses supporting its claim.  See 39 C.F.R. § 955.7(a).  Respondent argues that the complaint is inadequate when measured against the Rules of Practice, and the appeals must be dismissed because “[n]o allegation of negligence is included in Appellant’s Complaint, and such an allegation is required to show entitlement according to the physical damage clause.”  (Motion at 4).
Respondent does not challenge our jurisdiction.  Its motion is based solely on failure of the complaint to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.  See 41 U.S.C. §§ 7103-04.  “In appraising the sufficiency of the complaint we follow, of course, the accepted rule that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”  Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).  Such motions to dismiss should be considered in a light most favorable to plaintiff with every doubt resolved in favor of the plaintiff.  Balboa Ins. Co. v. United States, 3 Cl. Ct. 543, 545 (1983).  Additionally, the scope of a Board appeal is determined by the claim, the contracting officer’s final decision, and the appeal of the final decision, rather than solely by the complaint.  See, e.g., Joseph J. Fanucchi, PSBCA No. 5356, 08-1 BCA ¶ 33,809.
Appellant followed the terms of the contract and submitted its claims on the required claim form, an SF 95.  This form does not require the identification of the specific theory of recovery or the controlling contract clauses.  Further, the contracting officer’s analysis using the Physical Damage clause showed his understanding of the issues underlying the litigation.  Finally, Respondent does not argue that an injustice would occur by Appellant’s failure to have alleged specific facts in its complaint or that it does not know the basis for the claims.  See Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(e)(“[p]leadings must be construed so as to do justice”).  When considering these facts and circumstances, we determine that the Complaint is adequate and that continuing the litigation does not create an injustice to Respondent.

CONCLUSION

The Motion to Dismiss is denied.  The Board will schedule further proceedings by separate order.

Peter F. Pontzer
Administrative Judge
Board Member

I concur:

William A. Campbell 
Administrative Judge
Chairman

Gary E. Shapiro
Administrative Judge
Vice Chairman


1 These findings of fact are for the sole purpose of deciding this motion.
2 Reference to documents in the Appeal File are identified as “(AF XX).”