April 6, 2017
ESTHER WURZBERGER v. UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE
PSBCA Nos. 6471, 6483
APPEARANCE FOR APPELLANT
Esther Wurzberger
APPEARANCE FOR RESPONDENT
Jessica J. Stringer, Esq.
United States Postal Service Law Department
OPINION OF THE BOARD
Appellant, Esther Wurzberger, seeks $2,000,000 from Respondent, United States Postal Service, related to the Postal Service’s termination on notice of a contract postal unit in Brooklyn, New York. We deny the appeals, ruling in favor of the Postal Service.
FINDINGS OF FACT
DECISION
This case is substantially similar to the situation before the Board in Temple Contract Station, where we addressed a variety of theories challenging the Postal Service’s termination of a CPU contract based on inclusion of that CPU in the APWU collective bargaining agreement’s closure list. The Board in Temple Contract Station concluded that the Postal Service did not breach that contract by exercising a termination on notice clause. Temple Contract Station, 14 BCA ¶ 35,669 at 174,602. The Board specifically asked Ms. Wurzberger to explain why this case is distinguishable from that precedent. See October 13, 2016 Order. We discern four arguments by Ms. Wurzberger in an effort to do so.
First, Ms. Wurzberger argues that the Postal Service’s termination decision was made in bad faith because it discriminated against the CPU’s Yiddish-speaking staff and customers, and was insensitive to the Jewish culture of the Williamsburg neighborhood. Ms. Wurzberger further contends that the CPU contract was terminated in favor of a (presumably) non-Yiddish-speaking and non-sectarian post office resulting in a disservice to Yiddish-speaking customers. She similarly argues that the Postal Service’s exercise of the termination on notice clause breached the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing.
A bad faith determination would require clear and convincing proof that the Postal Service acted with a specific intent to injure Ms. Wurzberger. See Am-Pro Protective Agency, Inc. v. United States, 281 F.3d 1234, 1239-40 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Kalvar Corp., Inc. v. United States, 543 F.2d 1298, 1301-02 (Ct. Cl. 1976). The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing prohibits the parties from interfering with each other’s contract performance so as to destroy the reasonable expectations of the other party regarding the fruits of the contract. See Metcalfe Constr. Co. v. United States, 742 F.3d 984, 991 (Fed. Cir. 2014). The covenant does not expand a party’s contractual duties beyond those expressed in the contract and does not create duties inconsistent with express contract terms. See id.
The Postal Service terminated the Better Letter CPU contract because the CBA required its closure; no evidence shows an intent to injure Ms. Wurzberger. The record does not include any evidence that the language spoken by Better Letter CPU’s staff (or their religion, or religious sensitivities) was factored into the termination decision or considered in any way by postal officials. Further, this bad faith assertion is belied by the Postal Service’s attempts to substitute another CPU for closure in place of the Better Letter CPU (Finding 5).2 Regarding Ms. Wurzberger’s breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing argument, as the Board explained in Temple Contract Station, the legitimate exercise of an express contract right cannot breach the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing. Temple Contract Station, 14 BCA ¶ 35,669 at 174,601.
Ms. Wurzberger’s second argument emphasizes that the CBA required closure of full-service CPUs with post office box service. She therefore asserts that the Better Letter CPU, which did not provide post office box service nor sell money orders (Finding 3), was not a full-service CPU and should not have been included on the closure list. Although the CBA’s language required closure of “full-service” CPUs “with box sections” (Finding 4), Better Letter was included specifically in the list of twenty CPUs required to be closed (or converted to in-house operations). As discussed above, the record does not show that the Better Letter CPU was included on the closure list because of bad faith. Thus, regardless of whether the CPU offered post office box services, the Postal Service had the right to exercise the termination on notice clause, and acted reasonably when it did so, especially considering that the clause did not include express limitations on its use. In Temple Contract Station, we addressed a similar argument. There, the appellant argued that the CBA had identified the CPU at issue using an incorrect address, and therefore the Postal Service could have declined to close it. We held that since both the Postal Service and the APWU understood the CBA as requiring closure of the CPU at issue, the Postal Service acted reasonably by closing it. Temple Contract Station, 14 BCA ¶ 35,669 at 174,600. Similarly, here, it does not matter to our analysis whether the Better Letter CPU provided post office box service, as it specifically was included on the closure list.
Third, Ms. Wurzberger argues that the termination violated the Postal Service’s Supplying Principles and Practices (§ 5-13), which require the Postal Service’s Vice President of Supply Management to approve any “highly visible” contract termination. Even were we to agree that termination of Better Letter CPU’s contract required vice presidential approval, violation of that provision is not actionable by an affected contractor. Temple Contract Station, 14 BCA ¶ 35,669 at 174,599-600.
Fourth, Ms. Wurzberger argues that the decision to terminate her CPU represented poor public policy, and that termination was not in the Postal Service’s best interests. She argues that the CPU’s location and the language skills and religious sensitivity of her staff benefitted the community, that the community objected to the closure, and that the CPU closing resulted in overcrowding at the Williamsburg Post Office. Ms. Wurzberger also argues that closing any CPU was a bad idea, that some members of Congress disapproved of CPU closures, and that the APWU should not have been permitted to influence the Postal Service’s business decisions.
We need not explore the accuracy of these assertions because, as the Board explained in Temple Contract Station in rejecting such an argument, “[i]t is not our prerogative to substitute our judgement for the contracting officer’s as long as Respondent did not breach the contract.” Temple Contract Station, 14 BCA ¶ 35,669 at 174,602. Similarly, we need not consider whether closing the Better Letter CPU was in the Postal Service’s best interests. Because “the termination on notice clause did not require the contracting officer to decide that termination was in the Postal Service’s best interests,” this argument cannot provide a basis for relief. Temple Contract Station, 14 BCA ¶ 35,669 at 174,598. The Board has no role in deciding whether termination was the best course for the Postal Service or represented good public policy. Rather, our role is limited to deciding whether termination breached the contract. Id. It did not.
CONCLUSION
The Postal Service’s exercise of the termination on notice clause of the Better Letter CPU contract did not breach that contract. The appeals are denied.
Gary E. Shapiro
Administrative Judge
Chairman
I concur:
Alan R. Caramella
Administrative Judge
Vice Chairman
I concur:
Diane M. Mego
Administrative Judge
Board Member
1 The Board takes judicial notice of the distance between these facilities (mapquest.com, last visited April 6, 2017).
2 The Postal Service awarded another CPU contract within three months after termination, to Ms. Wurzberger to operate the Better Letter CPU again in close proximity to its former location (Finding 8). This supports a conclusion that, in the overall context of their relationship, the Postal Service did not intend to injure Ms. Wurzberger.