May 31, 2018

PATRICK M. MURRAY v. UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE

PSBCA Nos. 6635, 6640

APPEARANCE FOR APPELLANT:
Patrick M. Murray

APPEARANCE FOR RESPONDENT:
Peter J. McNulty, Esq.
United States Postal Service Law Department  

OPINION OF THE BOARD ON THE POSTAL SERVICE’S MOTION TO DISMISS OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Patrick M. Murray had a contract to deliver mail for the Postal Service.  In 2015, the parties mutually agreed to end the contract at the end of that year instead of 2017.
Mr. Murray filed a claim for (1) $25,793.60 based on age discrimination and breach of an oral agreement negotiated by the parties during contract renewal in June 2011, and (2) $46,557.96 in contract proceeds for the remainder of the contract term from January 1, 2016 through March 31, 2017.  Additionally, the Postal Service filed a claim for the return of $3,411.24 it mistakenly paid to Mr. Murray in January 2016 after the contract ended.
The Postal Service moves to dismiss part of Mr. Murray’s claim for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.  Alternatively, the Postal Service moves for summary judgment on all three claims.  As discussed below, we convert the motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment, and consider all three claims under that standard.
We deny the Postal Service’s motion for summary judgment as to the $25,793.60 claim.  We grant the motion for summary judgment by denying Mr. Murray’s claim for $46,557.96, and granting the Postal Service’s claim for $3,411.24.

FINDINGS OF FACT¹

1. In 2011, Mr. Murray held Contract HCR 96046 with the Postal Service to deliver mail in Cottonwood, California, at an annual rate of $45,325.32.  The contract was set to expire on June 30, 2011.  (AF 1 at 1, 5 at 13, 14; Uncontested Facts ¶ 1² ).
2. On May 17, 2011, the Postal Service’s contracting officer sent a renewal letter to Mr. Murray with revised terms and conditions which included a reduced annual rate.  The contracting officer also advised:  “If you are unable to accept a reduction to your current contract rate and decide not to renew your contract, a determination will be made to either solicit the service or consolidate it . . . .”  (AF 1 at 1-3).
3. The letter asked Mr. Murray to complete, sign, and submit a number of forms.  The Postal Service would then send him “the FINAL renewal documents.”  The letter ended with:  “We look forward to concluding an equitable renewal negotiation with you.  If you have any questions relative to the renewal process, please call your renewal specialist . . . .”  (AF 1 at 3, emphasis in original; Uncontested Facts ¶ 3).
4. On June 10, 2011, Mr. Murray sent a letter to the Postal Service’s renewal specialist,³ asking how the solicitation could include an increase in the number of mail boxes on his route, but a reduction in the estimated number of hours to perform the work.  The letter referenced a counteroffer previously submitted by Mr. Murray.  He also asked for a copy of the calculations used for the contract originally awarded eleven years earlier (AF 2).
5. On June 13, 2011, the Postal Service’s renewal specialist responded in an email that the contract either needed to be renewed that week or the Postal Service would compete the route.  The renewal specialist also explained that the rate was being reduced because there were too many hours for the number of mail boxes.  Finally, he explained that the calculations from eleven years ago were irrelevant.  (Pet. Exh. I).
6. The renewal specialist further responded to Mr. Murray’s pricing question by email on June 25, 2011, and provided two calculation sheets used in calculating the new rate (AF 3 at 6-7).
7. On June 25, 2011, Mr. Murray (in an email sent by his wife) explained that negotiations had been stressful, and requested that the renewal specialist “please mail the contract and the Hours and Miles Projections for this and prior contract negotiations, including but not limited to the first contract negotiation in 2000.”  (AF 3 at 6).
8. Despite not receiving information about the calculations used by the Postal Service in the 2000 negotiations, on June 29, 2011, Mr. Murray signed and returned the amendment renewing the contract.  The amendment provided:  “As a result of renewal negotiations between [the] supplier [Mr. Murray] and the Postal Service, [the] contract is amended as stated.”  (AF 5 at 14).  The annual rate of compensation was $39,602.32 (about $6,000 less than the previous annual rate) with a four-year term from July 1, 2011, to June 30, 2015.  The contracting officer then signed the contract on July 16, 2011, and sent a copy to Mr. Murray.  (AF 4; AF 5 at 11-12, 14-15, 21; Uncontested Facts ¶ 4).
9. After signing the contract renewal, on July 20, 2011, Mr. Murray sent a complaint about the negotiation process to a different contracting officer seeking an investigation.  Among other things, he believed that the renewal specialist had agreed to pay an annual rate higher than the $39,602.32 rate in the new contract he signed.  Mr. Murray asked the contracting officer to investigate how the hours were determined and the renewal specialist’s alleged promise of a higher annual rate.  (AF 6).
10. Mr. Murray also complained that during negotiations the renewal specialist used coercive and threatening language by saying “take it or leave it” and threatened to compete the contract if Mr. Murray did not agree with the Postal Service’s terms.  Furthermore, Mr. Murray complained about the local postmaster providing information to the renewal specialist and the Postal Service’s use of time cards as a basis for negotiating the contract rate.  (AF 6 at 108-10, 112).
11. Five months later, on December 30, 2011, a third contracting officer responded to Mr. Murray’s July 20, 2011 letter.  The contracting officer had investigated the negotiation process used by the parties.  He concluded that negotiations had been conducted properly and that the rates were mathematically correct.  He also explained how the Postal Service used time cards as information to negotiate the contract rate.  Finally, he explained that the role of the postmaster was to provide information to the contracting officer about the contract specifications such as the line of travel and mail counts.  (AF 8).
12. In his sworn declaration in opposition to the Postal Service’s motion for summary judgment, Mr. Murray states that he was singled out for a greater price reduction than other similarly situated contractors based on his age.  At the Cottonwood Post Office there were nine similarly situated contractors whose contracts were renewed at about the same time.  According to Mr. Murray, he was the only contractor in his sixties, and was the only one whose annual contract price at renewal was cut more than $1,000; his price cut was approximately $6,000.  The only alleged difference between Mr. Murray and the other contractors was his age.  (Murray Response to Motion for Summary Judgment/Declaration at 8).
13. In response to Mr. Murray’s complaint, the contracting officer determined that the rate was reduced because a route survey showed that fewer hours were needed to complete the route than were included in the prior contract (AF 38 at 289).
    Contract Terms and Conditions
14. The June 2011 contract included Section B.5, Screening/Identification Requirements, in the Statement of Work which provided:
    At contract award, and thereafter, the supplier must identify to the administrative official all individuals who require access to facilities, the mails, or need authority to drive. . . .
    [T]he supplier must submit to the administrative official two original Forms 2025, Contract Personnel Questionnaire, one original form 2181-C, Authorization and Release Background Investigation, two original Forms FD 258 Fingerprint Card, and two full face 1 ¼” x 1 ¼”, color photographs. . . .  A 5-year driving record [also] must be provided. . . .
    Postal regulations require that suppliers and their employees who drive be rescreened once every four years, or by direction of the administrative official. 
    (AF 5 at 29-30; Uncontested Facts ¶ 6).
15. The contract also incorporated Management Instruction (PO-530-2009-4), Screening Highway Transportation Contract Employees, which provided detailed instructions on screening contract employees (AF 5 at 30).⁴   The Management Instruction specifically required that “Suppliers and their personnel must be rescreened at least once every four years.  Security clearances are specific to individuals (not contracts); the rescreening may or may not occur at the time the contract is renewed.”  The Management Instruction also required drug screening for drivers by an approved lab.  (AF 18 at 223).
16. The contracting officer emphasized the screening requirement in the transmittal letter accompanying the signed contract.  The contracting officer specifically advised:
    All suppliers and their employees must have valid Non-Sensitive Security Clearance and display their ID badge on their outer garment when on Postal Service property.  Security Clearance is specific to the individual, not the contract.  Security Clearance is valid for four (4) years from the clearance date.  If your non-sensitive Security Clearance has expired, we have enclosed abbreviated guidelines on the screening process (Form HC208 Security/Driver Screening Procedures Highlights).  Additional screening questions should be addressed to the Administrative Official.
    (AF 4 at 9, emphasis in original).
17. Section C.1. Payment (Highway) (Clause B-74)(Modified)(March 2006) provided that the contract was fixed price, and Section C.1.1 Annual Rate Payments provided that payments would be made monthly (AF 5 at 39, 51).
18. Section C.3.4 Claims and Disputes (March 2006) provided:
      a.  This contract is subject to the Contract Disputes Act of 1978.…
      b.  Except as provided in the Act, all disputes arising under or relating to this contract must be resolved under this contract.…
      c.  “Claim” as used in this clause, means a written demand or written assertion by one of the contracting parties seeking, as a matter of right, the payment of money in a sum certain, the adjustment or interpretation of contract terms, or other relief arising under or relating to this contract. …
      j.   The supplier must proceed diligently with performance of this contract, pending final resolution of any request for relief, claim, appeal, or action arising under the contract, and comply with any decision of the contracting officer. 
    (AF 5 at 51-52).
19. Section C.3.7.d Accountability of Supplier (Clause B-64) provided:  “The supplier shall, promptly upon discovery, refund (i) any overpayment made by the Postal Service for service performed, or (ii) any payment for service not rendered.”  (AF 5 at 53).
    Contract Extension
20. In the fall of 2014, the parties discussed extending the contract term.  Mr. Murray believed that the Postal Service waived the driver screening requirements that he would have otherwise been required to perform in 2015.  Mr. Murray also believed that the Postal Service agreed to defer driver rescreening until at least March 2017.  (Murray Aff. at 16, attached to Second Amended Complaint). 
21. In October 2014, Mr. Murray and the Postal Service agreed to extend the contract term.  The amended contract extended performance from June 30, 2015, to March 31, 2017.  (AF 11 at 136-37; Uncontested Facts ¶ 5). 
22. The other terms and conditions (see Findings 14 through 19), including the rescreening requirements, remained the same (AF 11).
    Contract Term
23. In October 2015, the Postal Service notified Mr. Murray that it had been four years since his drivers had been screened.  It directed Mr. Murray (and the other contractors at the Cottonwood Postal Service facility) to rescreen their drivers as required by the contract.  (See Findings 14-16; AF 18).
24. On October 21, 2015, Mr. Murray and five other mail delivery contractors with similar contracts (who identified themselves as the “Cottonwood Contract Carriers”) informed the contracting officer that they believed that the Postal Service had waived driver rescreening during the 2014 negotiations because their contracts were being extended and not renewed (AF 18 at 180-82).
25. They also complained that in October 2014 they were only given three days to consider contract extensions (AF 18 at 180).
26. On November 12, 2015, the contracting officer directed that Mr. Murray’s drivers be rescreened citing contract clause B.5 Screening/Identification Requirements (see Finding 14).  He also provided a copy of Management Instruction (PO-530-2009-4), Screening Highway Transportation Contractor Personnel.  (AF 20).
27. Rather than paying for the driver rescreening, on December 15, 2015, Mr. Murray requested that the contract end effective December 31, 2015.  The Postal Service agreed to change the contract term to end on December 31, 2015 (AF 28 at 244-46; AF 29 at 249; AF 30 at 250; Uncontested Facts ¶ 16).
28. The renewal specialist sent Mr. Murray an unsigned PS Form 7406, AMENDMENT TO TRANSPORTATION SERVICES CONTRACT, for Mr. Murray’s review and signature.  The “DESCRIPTION OF AMENDMENT” (Block 3) provided: 
    CONTRACT TERM MODIFICATION
    Effective close of business 12/23/2015 supplier agrees to the new contract term dates at the prevailing rate in force. . . .
    New Contract Term:  07/01/2011 to 12/31/2015
    Supplier agrees this is at no cost to either party and no further claims will be submitted.
    (AF 29 at 251).
29. Mr. Murray signed the amendment, but he reserved his right to file a claim (AF 31 at 256-57).
    PSBCA No. 6635:  Mr. Murray’s Claim for $72,351.56
30. On February 22, 2016, Mr. Murray submitted a claim to the contracting officer stating “[t]his claim is in the estimated amount of $84,722.97.”  The claim amount is also qualified with the term “approximate.”  (AF 34 at 276, 280; Uncontested Facts ¶ 20).
31. On May 16, 2016, Mr. Murray amended his claim to delete the terms “estimated” and “approximate,” and stated a sum certain of $72,351.56 (AF 36 at 287; Uncontested Facts ¶ 20).
32. Mr. Murray’s claim had two parts.  First, Mr. Murray claimed that he was entitled to $25,793.60 because he allegedly entered into an oral contract for a higher rate with the renewal specialist before signing the contract on June 29, 2011.  The $25,793.60 represents the difference between the higher rate in the oral contract and the rate in the signed contract.  (AF 6 at 110, 112; 15 at 154, 156; 16 at 159; 34 at 278, 281).
33. Second, Mr. Murray claimed $46,557.96 for compensation from January 1, 2016, through March 31, 2017 (AF 34 at 279, 287).
34. On July 15, 2016, the contracting officer issued a final decision denying both parts of Mr. Murray’s claim (AF 38).
35. The contracting officer denied Mr. Murray’s claim for $25,793.60 because: (1) the renewal specialist did not have a contracting officer’s warrant, which meant he could not enter into a binding contract; (2) the written contract signed by both parties included the agreed upon rate; and, (3) the contracting officer did not believe Mr. Murray signed the contract under duress (AF 38).
36. The contracting officer also denied Mr. Murray’s claim for $46,557.96 because:  (1) the written contract extension signed by the parties included the screening requirements; (2) the renewal specialist did not have the authority to change the terms of the contract; and (3) the amount claimed was excessive for submitting driver “screening paperwork.”  (AF 38).
37. Mr. Murray timely appealed the denial of his claim, which we docketed as PSBCA No. 6635.
    PSBCA No. 6640:  Overpayment by the Postal Service
38. Mr. Murray stopped delivering mail on his route when the contract ended at the close of business on December 31, 2015 (AF 31 at 256; Uncontested Facts ¶ 18).  The Postal Service, nonetheless, paid Mr. Murray $3,411.24 on January 29, 2016, for mail delivery during the month of January 2016.  The contracting officer later issued a final decision claiming entitlement to a refund of that amount.  (AF 38; Uncontested Facts ¶ 19).
39. Mr. Murray timely appealed the decision, which we docketed as PSBCA No. 6640.  We consolidated PSBCA Nos. 6635 and 6640.

DECISION

Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim
The Postal Service’s motion asks the Board to dismiss at least a part of the appeal because the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.  Alternatively, the motion asks for summary judgment.
The Postal Service’s motion references documents other than the pleadings and thus goes beyond the type of documents that the Board may properly consider when ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.  In that situation, the Board may convert a motion for failure to state a claim into a motion for summary judgment, provided Mr. Murray had notice of the Board’s intent to do so.  Easter v. United States, 575 F.3d 1332, 1335–37 (Fed. Cir. 2009); MBD Maint., LLC v. United States Postal Service, PSBCA No. 6625, 17-1 BCA ¶ 36,666.  Here, of course, the motion itself asks for summary judgment in the alternative to the motion to dismiss.  Further, in responding to the motion, Mr. Murray responded to both the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and the motion for summary judgment, evidencing his understanding that the Board could decide the appeals on that basis.  Therefore, rather than ruling on the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, we convert the entire motion to a motion for summary judgment.  Our analysis of that motion follows.
Motion for Summary Judgment
Summary judgment will be granted if there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Finley v. United States Postal Service, PSBCA No. 6606, 17-1 BCA ¶ 36,676 (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986)); Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 56.  A party seeking summary judgment bears the burden of informing the Board of the basis for the motion and of identifying those portions of the record that the moving party claims will demonstrate the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact.  Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.  Similarly, a party is entitled to summary judgment when the nonmoving party carries the ultimate burden of proof and has failed “to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.”  Id. at 322.  As to the issues before the Board, Mr. Murray has the burden of proof on his monetary claim, Green v. United States Postal Service, PSBCA No. 6484, 16-1 BCA ¶ 36,297, and the Postal Service has the burden of proof on its claim for the return of money it paid Mr. Murray in January 2016.  JM Carranza Trucking Co. v. United States Postal Service, PSBCA No. 6354, 14-1 BCA ¶ 35,776.
The Postal Service moves for summary judgement, as a matter of law, on Mr. Murray’s two-part claim for $72,351.56.  The Postal Service argues that the language of the written contract controls the terms and conditions of his compensation.  See, e.g., Bell/Heery v. United States, 739 F.3d 1324, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2014).  The Postal Service alleges, and Mr. Murray does not contest, that the Postal Service paid him the rate identified in the written contract.
The Postal Service also moves for summary judgment on its claim for $3,411.24 because Mr. Murray was not entitled to the money it mistakenly paid him for the month of January 2016.
For the purposes of this motion, we construe any disputed facts in Mr. Murray’s favor.  Laguna Constr. Co. v. Carter, 828 F.3d 1364, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2016).

• Mr. Murray’s Claim for $72,351.56
  Mr. Murray argues that he is entitled to additional compensation for both parts of his claim because there were separate oral agreements which bind the Postal Service.  Because the facts relating to the two parts of his claim differ, we analyze each part separately.
1. 2011 Renewal — $25,793.60 for Rate Increase
   The Postal Service moves for summary judgment because (1) the prior oral agreements (even if they did exist) constitute parol evidence which cannot be used to vary the written terms of the contract and (2) the renewal specialist did not have actual authority to bind the Postal Service.
   The parol evidence rule is a rule of substantive law that prohibits consideration of extrinsic evidence to alter the terms of a written agreement that “has been adopted by the parties as an expression of their final understanding.”  Barron Bancshares, Inc. v. United States, 366 F.3d 1360, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citing David Nassif Assocs. v. United States, 557 F.2d 249, 256 (Ct. Cl. 1977)).  A writing that is final and complete is an integrated agreement, and the effect of the integration is the inadmissibility of prior or contemporaneous agreements to modify or contradict terms of the written agreement.  See David Nassif, 557 F.2d at 256; Restatement (Second) Of Contracts, § 213(1) (Am. Law. Inst. 1981) (“A binding integrated agreement discharges prior agreements to the extent that it is inconsistent with them.”); see also Rumsfeld v. Freedom NY, Inc., 329 F.3d 1320, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2003); McAbee Constr., Inc. v. United States, 97 F.3d 1431, 1434 (Fed. Cir. 1996).  Whether a contract is integrated is a question of law.  Sylvania Elec. Prods., Inc. v. United States, 458 F.2d 994, 1006, n.6 (Ct. Cl. 1972). 
   Whether there is an integrated agreement is a preliminary question which must be addressed before applying the parol evidence rule.  Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 209(2).  “Where the parties reduce an agreement to a writing which in view of its completeness and specificity reasonably appears to be a complete agreement, it is taken to be an integrated agreement unless it is established by other evidence that the writing did not constitute a final expression.”  .  Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 209(3).  Mr. Murray provides no evidence that the written contract was not the final expression of the agreement.  In this case, the written contract is a complete agreement and thus, as a matter of law, we conclude that it is integrated.
   Applying the parol evidence rule to the facts here, we hold that Mr. Murray may not use a prior oral agreement to increase the annual rate of compensation because the annual rate is clearly stated in the contract.  See Sarah M. Mitchell, PSBCA No. 6173, 09-1 BCA ¶ 34,107 (when a contract is clear on its rate of pay, there is no basis for considering oral evidence regarding price negotiations leading to its execution). 
   Even though Mr. Murray may not use parol evidence to alter the written contract, he may use evidence relating to the negotiations leading up to that alleged oral agreement to support his defenses of duress and age discrimination.  .  Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 214(d)(earlier negotiations may be used to establish illegality, duress, or other invalidating cause).  Mr. Murray, in his sworn declaration, asserts that he was discriminated against because of his age, resulting in the Postal Service’s decision to pay him a substantially lower contract rate than other younger contractors (Finding 12).  In contrast, the Postal Service maintains that it calculated Mr. Murray’s new rate based on a route survey showing that the route could be completed in fewer hours and that it was correcting the excessively high rate paid during the prior contract (Finding 13).
   To support his position, Mr. Murray argues that the Postal Service broke the law, citing 29 U.S.C. § 633a, Nondiscrimination on account of age in Federal Government employment.  Because Mr. Murray was a contractor, not an employee, that statute does not apply to this appeal.  Nonetheless, we construe his argument to be that the Postal Service acted in bad faith during contract negotiations resulting in a lower rate.  Mr. Murray essentially argues that he is entitled to contract reformation based on the Restatement’s exception for “other invalidating cause.”
   To prove bad faith, Mr. Murray must show by clear and convincing evidence that the Postal Service had a specific intent to harm him.  See Finley, 17-1 BCA ¶ 36,676 (citing Am-Pro Protective Agency, Inc. v. United States, 281 F.3d 1234, 1240 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).  In Am-Pro, the Federal Circuit upheld a lower court determination that an uncorroborated affidavit was insufficient to create a genuine dispute of material fact particularly when the contractor was represented by counsel and waited for six years in silence.  281 F.3d at 1241.  We applied Am-Pro in both Franklin Wilborn, PSBCA No. 6260, 10-2 BCA ¶ 34,608, and Finley, 17-1 BCA ¶ 36,676, where we granted motions for summary judgment because, even construing the disputed facts in the nonmoving parties’ favor, they could not prove bad faith to the clear and convincing standard of proof.
   The present case is distinguishable from Am-Pro, Wilborn, and Finley.  Unlike Am-Pro, Mr. Murray is self-represented, raised the issue of unfair negotiations from the renewal’s outset in 2011, and continued to raise the issue thereafter.  Furthermore, in contrast to Am-Pro, Wilborn and Finley, Mr. Murray has provided a sworn affidavit alleging that he was disparately treated based solely on his being 68 at the time of renewal while the other contractors were all less than 60.  While their prices were reduced in amounts less than $1,000, his was reduced by approximately $6,000.  These details make his allegation more than a conclusory statement.  See United States v. Stein, 881 F.3d 853, 857 (11th Cir. 2018) (a self-serving affidavit may defeat a motion for summary judgment, but it cannot be conclusory)(citing Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990)).  When combined, the facts sworn to by Mr. Murray could lead to a conclusion that the Postal Service had a specific intent to injure him by discriminating against him based on his age.  Moreover, Mr. Murray’s affidavit, unlike the one relied on in Finley, was based on personal knowledge, not hearsay.
   The Postal Service explained that Mr. Murray’s rate was reduced based on a route survey showing a lower rate was justified.  Given two different factual explanations, we are faced with a genuine dispute of material fact.  While it may be difficult for Mr. Murray to prove age discrimination caused the lower rate, he has provided sufficient evidence to create a genuine dispute of material fact, and should be allowed an opportunity to prove his case.  Accordingly, we deny the motion for summary judgment.
2. 2015 Driver Rescreening — claim for $46,557.96
   The Postal Service moves for summary judgment arguing that it directed Mr. Murray to comply with the contract’s express driver rescreening requirements, and thus Mr. Murray is not entitled to any relief based on that direction.  In contrast to the prior claim, Mr. Murray does not allege age discrimination for this claim.  Rather, Mr. Murray argues that the Postal Service orally waived the driver rescreening requirement as part of a second oral agreement made prior to execution of the contract extension in 2014.  Indeed, Mr. Murray agrees that five other similarly situated contractors made the same complaint about the rescreening requirement when their contracts were extended (Finding 24).
   In 2015, the Postal Service directed Mr. Murray to provide the rescreening information necessary for himself and his three drivers.  He complained to the contracting officer about the cost for four sets of fingerprints, four urinalysis tests, four passport photos, and four drivers’ records.  Instead of providing the rescreening information, Mr. Murray asked the Postal Service to end the contract by December 31, 2015.⁵
   Under the contract’s Claims and Disputes clause (Finding 18), Mr. Murray was required to “proceed diligently with performance of this contract, pending final resolution of any request for relief.”  Mr. Murray, however, argues that he was excused from continued performance because the Postal Service breached the contract when it directed the rescreening.  We disagree.
   A party may stop performing in the face of a material breach by the other party, despite the standard language in the Claims and Disputes clause.  Alliant Techsystems, Inc. v. United States, 178 F.3d 1260, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 1999).  The fundamental problem with Mr. Murray’s argument, however, is that the Postal Service merely directed him to comply with the written terms of the contract—nothing more.  As noted, the contract required the rescreening every four years.  Thus the Postal Service’s direction to perform the rescreening was permitted by the contract, and, as a matter of law, it was not a breach—material or otherwise.  Mr. Murray therefore was not entitled to stop performing pending resolution of a dispute.
   • Parol Evidence
     Mr. Murray seeks to avoid this result by arguing that, before the parties signed the contract extension in 2014, he negotiated a separate oral contract with the renewal specialist that waived the rescreening requirement.  We are not persuaded.  As stated earlier in this decision, the parol evidence rule provides that such an oral agreement cannot be used to defeat the clear terms of the contract.  Freedom NY, 329 F.3d at 1328; McAbee Constr., 97 F.3d at 1434; Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 213.  As applied to this case, that means that Mr. Murray may not use evidence of a prior oral agreement to alter the unambiguous contract requirement to perform the rescreening.
   • Duress
     Mr. Murray also seeks to avoid the rescreening requirement by presenting a multi-faceted duress claim.  He argues that he signed the contract extension in 2014 under duress.  In essence, he asks us to substitute the terms of an alleged oral agreement—which according to Mr. Murray waived the rescreening in 2015—for the express terms of a written contract that did require rescreening in 2015.  While a party may be able to avoid the terms of a written agreement if it can prove duress, the legal requirements necessary to prove duress are “exacting.”  Emp’r Ins. of Wausau v. United States, 764 F.2d 1572, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1985).  A party seeking to avoid a contract by duress must prove that (1) it involuntarily accepted the other party’s terms, (2) circumstances permitted no other alternative, and (3) those circumstances were the result of the other party’s coercive acts.  North Star Steel Co. v. United States, 477 F.3d 1324, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
     Here, Mr. Murray has not been able to meet any of these exacting requirements.  In 2014, Mr. Murray was free to sign—or not sign—the contract extension.  Instead of signing the extension he could simply have let the contract expire by its terms in June 2015.  Rather than doing that, however, he chose to sign the extension, which required the rescreening in 2015.  Nothing in the record suggests that the Postal Service did anything during the 2014 negotiations that had a wrongfully coercive effect on Mr. Murray.  See Sys. Tech. Assoc., Inc. v. United States, 699 F.2d 1381, 1387–88 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Matheson Postal Serv. v. United States Postal Service, PSBCA No. 6588, 16-1 BCA ¶ 36,279.
     Mr. Murray’s allegations regarding duress also claim that in 2014 the Postal Service only gave him three days to decide whether he wanted to sign the contract extension.  Here again, Mr. Murray has not shown that the three-day deadline was wrongfully coercive or left him with no reasonable alternative.  As just addressed above, he was free to refuse the extension request and then either try to renew the contract in 2015 or let the contract expire.  Steve C. Miller, PSBCA No. 5264, 09-2 BCA ¶ 34,282 (because Mr. Miller was free not to renew the contract, his agreeing to the renewal was not an involuntary action supporting a finding of duress); Patrick R. Carlile, PSBCA No. 38687, 97-2 BCA ¶ 29,195 (“[W]hile Appellant may have faced a difficult business decision, the stress associated with such a decision does not support a finding of duress.”).
     Mr. Murray also argues economic duress based on his age.⁶   He was 68 years old at the time his contract was renewed and 70 when it was extended in 2014.  Mr. Murray contends that if he had not extended the contract in 2014, he would not have been in a position to compete for the contract when it expired in 2015, and he would have had difficulty finding a different job if he refused.  However, Mr. Murray’s personal financial situation and his perception that it would have been difficult for him to find another job are not the result of wrongfully coercive acts by the Postal Service and, thus, do not constitute duress.  See Gary W. Noble, PSBCA No. 4094, 99-2 BCA ¶ 30,413.  In Noble, we faced a similar situation in that the Postal Service insisted during contract negotiations that the rate of compensation be substantially reduced.  Mr. Noble signed the agreement even though he believed the new price was unfair.  We held that “[d]riving a hard bargain, even one that causes considerable financial loss, did not constitute duress or breach the implied duty of fair dealing under Appellant’s expiring contract.”  Id.  The Postal Service is allowed to drive a hard bargain without breaching the contract.
   • Due Process
     Mr. Murray next argues that he has been deprived of due process.  Mr. Murray does not explain how he was deprived of due process on his claim for $46,557.96.⁷   The Contract Disputes Act, 41 U.S.C. §§ 7101-09, and our Rules of Practice, 39 C.F.R. Part 955, set the procedural requirements for these appeals.  Because we are following those procedural requirements, Mr. Murray is receiving the process that is due.  See J.M. Carranza Trucking, 14-1 BCA ¶ 35,776; Frank Baiamonte, PSBCA No. 5297, 08-1 BCA ¶ 33,852.
   • Promissory Estoppel
     Finally, Mr. Murray alleges that he is entitled to compensation based on promissory estoppel and detrimental reliance.  Specifically Mr. Murray argues he detrimentally relied on the renewal specialist’s promise that the rescreening requirements would be waived when he agreed to sign the October 2014 extension. 
     Promissory estoppel occurs when there is a promise which the promisor would reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance by the promisee.  Law Mathematics and Tech., Inc. v. United States, 779 F.2d 675, 678 (Fed. Cir. 1985); John C. Adcock, Detrimental Reliance, 45 La. L. Rev. 752, 754 (1985)(promissory estoppel is when the promisor is estopped from denying the binding force of his promise).  Promissory estoppel is used to create a cause of action.  P.J. Dick, Inc. v. General Services Administration, CBCA 461, 07-1 BCA ¶ 33,534.  Obligations based on promissory estoppel are founded on contracts implied-in-law.  Protecting the Homeland Innovations, LLC, ASBCA No. 58366, 13 BCA ¶ 35,398 (citing Hercules Inc. v. United States, 516 U.S. 417, 423 (1996)).  Our jurisdiction does not extend to implied-in-law contracts.  Id.; see also 1-A Const. & Fire, LLP v. Dep’t of Agric., CBCA 2693, 15-1 BCA ¶ 35,913 (a contractor cannot pursue a promissory estoppel cause of action at a board).⁸   Thus, we do not have jurisdiction for such a cause of action.
     In summary, there is no genuine dispute as to the terms of the written contract which required driver rescreening every four years.  Mr. Murray’s assertion that the requirement was waived is based solely on the allegation of a prior oral agreement in 2014.  As a matter of law, his assertion fails because the parol evidence rule bars the consideration of an alleged oral agreement when, as here, it contradicts unambiguous terms of the parties’ integrated written agreement.  McAbee, 97 F.3d at 1434.
     Mr. Murray seeks to avoid the explicit contract terms by asserting duress, deprivation of due process, and promissory estoppel.  As discussed above, however, construing the facts relating to these issues in Mr. Murray’s favor, he cannot avoid the terms of the written contract and these arguments must fail.  The Postal Service, therefore, is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and the second part of Mr. Murray’s claim is denied.
• The Postal Service’s Claim for $3,411.24
  Mr. Murray did not deliver mail for the Postal Service in January 2016 after the contract ended, but the Postal Service mistakenly paid him $3,411.24 at the end of January 2016 (Finding 38).  Moreover, the contract provided:  “The Supplier shall promptly . . . refund . . . any payment for service not rendered.”  (Finding 19).  Mr. Murray presents no argument for why he is entitled to retain the mistaken payment.  Accordingly, the Postal Service’s motion for summary judgment on its claim for $3,411.24 is granted.

ORDER

The Postal Service’s motion for summary judgment is denied in part and granted in part.  We deny the Postal Service’s motion for summary judgement regarding the $25,793.60 claim.  We will issue a separate Order, setting a trial schedule for this portion of Mr. Murray’s claim.
We grant the Postal Service’s motion for summary judgment as to Mr. Murray’s $46,557.96 claim, and therefore deny that claim. 
We grant the Postal Service’s motion for summary judgment as to its claim for $3,411.24.

Peter F. Pontzer
Administrative Judge
Board Member

I concur:
Gary E.Shapiro
Administrative Judge
Chairman

I concur:
Alan R. Caramella
Administrative Judge
Vice Chairman