In the Matter of the Complaint Against

DANCO DANZIG KINGS KINGS ENTERPRISES
Post Office Box 21487
Post Office Box 21517 at
Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33316

P.S. Docket No. 5/15;

Lussier, Edward F.

APPEARANCES FOR COMPLAINANT:
ThomasA. Ziebarth, Esq.
Law Department U. S. Postal Service
Washington, D.C.

APPEARANCES FOR RESPONDENT:
Robert L. Beals, Esq.
Fort Lauderdale, Florida

POSTAL SERVICE DECISION

The Respondent herein has taken an appeal from the Initial Decision of Administrative Law Judge Quentin E. Grant which recommended the issuance of a mail-stop order under 39 United States Code § 3005 based upon findings of materially false representations in Respondent's conduct of its business through the mail. The work-at-home scheme which Respondent merchandises is explained in sufficient detail in Judge Grant's Initial Decision and needs no further elaboration here.

Respondent has filed two exceptions to the Initial Decision. The first exception is to the denial of its motion to dismiss the Complaint as to the Respondent DANZIG. The second exception relates to one of the three representations found materially false by Judge Grant. Accordingly, and since the remaining two charges of false representation were upheld and no appeal taken from the Initial Decision in their regard, a mail-stop order appears appropriate in any event, the only issue on appeal being whether it is to apply to the Respondent DANZIG and whether one of the three bases for its issuance should be stricken.

As to Respondent's first exception, the matter of dismissing the Compliant against DANZIG, Complainant's reply on appeal takes the position that it agrees that the circular which is now utilized in connection with the DANZIG promotion is not within the ambit of the Complaint and recommends that the Complaint be dismissed without prejudice as to Respondent's trade style DANZIG. While the circular originally utilized appears within the ambit of at least one allegation of the Complaint filed in this case, the fact that it is no longer in use coupled with Respondent's concession regarding the new circular renders issuance of an order to encompass DANZIG unnecessary at this time. Accordingly, although not for the reasons advanced by Respondent, the Complaint as to Respondent DANZIG is dismissed without prejudice.

Respondent's second exception relates to Judge Grant's finding that the representation regarding time to be expended by the homeworker was materially false. That representation, as charged in the Complaint,was that "Respondent's mailing program involves nothing other than a few hours work weekly at home stuffing and mailing circulars." Respondent contends in effect that while the ultimate conclusion of material falsity is drawn in the Initial Decision it is not discussed. The implication is that it was not fully considered and is unsupported by subsidiary findings. Respondent traces the line of reasoning set forth in paragraphs 7 through 9 of the Findings of Fact in the Initial Decision in support of its contention. In so doing it does not give full credit to those portions of Findings of Fact 7 and 8 which relate to efforts by homeworkers other than "stuffing and mailing circulars." This exception is accordingly disallowed.

With the modification dismissing the Complaint without prejudice insofar as it relates to Respondent DANZIG, the Initial Decision is affirmed and a remedial stop order is being issued forthwith.