In the Matter of the Petition by

MAUREEN BROOKS
7610 Maritime Lane

at

Springfield, VA 22153-1627

P.S. Docket No. DCA 02-489

APPEARANCE FOR PETITIONER:
William Brown
12 Mount Run
Tinton Falls, NJ  07753-7674

APPEARANCE FOR RESPONDENT:
Kevin M. Kozlowski
Labor Relations Specialist
United States Postal Service
8409 Lee Highway
Merrifield, VA  22081-9402

FINAL DECISION ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
UNDER THE DEBT COLLECTION ACT OF 1982

            Petitioner, Maureen Brooks, filed a timely Motion for Reconsideration, under 39 C.F.R. §961.9, of the February 7, 2003 Final Decision in this case.  The Decision held Petitioner liable for $13,100.67, for the loss of a registered mail package containing cash from the post office at which Petitioner is the Manager.  Respondent filed a reply, opposing the motion.

            Petitioner argues several points, some of which were raised at the hearing but not argued as a basis for relief from liability.  First, Petitioner contends that she did not have a supervisory staff sufficient for an office of the size of Buckingham Station.  The only testimony on this point was that the regular T-6 (supervisory clerk), and the clerk who regularly worked in the registry cage, were not working on the day the loss apparently occurred.  (Tr. 81, 96).  This was the reason Petitioner borrowed Mr. Cross from another post office.  There is no evidence, however, that this amounted to a failure of Postal Service management to provide an adequate staff for Buckingham Station, or that the temporary absence of these employees prevented Petitioner from carrying out her duties with regard to the security of her post office.

            Second, Petitioner argues that the registry cage was inadequate.  Petitioner testified that one of the changes she made after the incident of May 14/15, 2002, was to get a new registry cage (Tr. 96-97), but there is no evidence that money could not be secured overnight in the old cage and safe, or that she previously had made any request to upgrade the quality of her registry cage.

            Third, Petitioner argues, as she did at the hearing, that the postal inspectors did an incomplete investigation by not interviewing all the employees and by not pursuing their investigation of the individual who failed the polygraph examination.  Perhaps the inspectors could have done more, but this issue was addressed in the Final Decision of February 7, 2003, and Petitioner has raised nothing new.

            Next, Petitioner argues that it was not proven that ten employees had access to the safe.  One of the items on the inspector’s list of security violations was that too many people had access to the safe, and this was also one of the findings in the Final Decision as demonstrating Petitioner’s failure to adhere to prescribed procedures for maintaining security of registered packages.  The finding in the Final Decision was based on Petitioner’s testimony.  She testified that prior to the incident that resulted in the loss, about ten employees had access to the safe.  She also agreed that this was improper and testified that one of the changes she implemented was to reduce that number to five.  (Tr. 97-98).

            Petitioner also argues that, contrary to the inspector’s assertions, PS Form 1625 (a log used to record any entry into the registry cage) and PS Form 3854 (Manifold Registry Dispatch Book – used to list registered items placed in the safe) were both in use at Buckingham Station.  As to the Form 3854, it was noted in footnote 4 of the Final Decision that the record was unclear whether this form was used regularly at Buckingham Station but that it appeared that Mr. Cross did use it on May 14, 2002.  It was concluded, therefore, that even if Buckingham Station was not using the correct form regularly, this did not contribute to the loss (Final Decision, pp. 7-8).  As to the use of Form 1625, Petitioner did not testify that this form was used before May 14, 2002, and I find no evidence in the record that it was.  Therefore, Petitioner’s argument as to the Form 1625 is not supported by the record.

            Finally, in response to a finding in the Final Decision that Petitioner failed to follow prescribed procedures (Sections 221.13 and 221.23 of the F-1 Handbook) by not requiring that there be a witness to the preparation of bank deposits, Petitioner cites another provision of the F-1 Handbook (Section 333.2-7) to suggest there is no requirement to have a witness.  Section 333.2, titled, “Preparing Deposits,” states, in subsections 2 and 7, that the preparer should count the funds in the presence of a witness, then have the witness make an independent count, and that both the preparer and the witness should sign the deposit slip.  Subsection 7 then states, as Petitioner correctly quotes: “If a witness is not available, it must be noted on the office copy of the deposit slip.”  I do not read this latter provision as deleting the requirement to have a witness, or as granting approval for adopting a regular procedure of not using a witness.  The inspector’s investigative memorandum reported that a witness was not being used on a daily basis at Buckingham Station.  Petitioner presented no evidence to contradict this, Mr. Cross did not have a witness on May 14, 2002, and there is no notation on the deposit slip that a witness was unavailable.  The conclusion remains, therefore, that Petitioner failed to enforce, as a standard procedure, the requirement that someone witness the preparation of bank deposits.

            The Motion for Reconsideration is denied.

Bruce R. Houston
Chief Administrative Law Judge