P.S. Docket No. AO 15-207


March 10, 2016

In the Matter of the Administrative Offset Petition

VOLITA EDMOND v. UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE

P.S. Docket No. AO 15-207

APPEARANCE FOR PETITIONER:
Volita Edmond, pro se

APPEARANCE FOR RESPONDENT:
Jane Davis
Labor Relations Specialist

INITIAL DECISION

Respondent, United States Postal Service, sought to collect from Petitioner, Volita Edmond, a debt in the amount of $1,937.41 based upon overdrawn annual leave.  Petitioner filed a Petition for Hearing on July 7, 2015.  A hearing was conducted in Oakland, California on October 14, 2015.1  The following findings are based on the record.

FINDINGS OF FACT

  1. On May 28, 2008, Petitioner was injured on the job while employed by Respondent (Resp. Exh. 5, p. 3).2
  2. On May 30, 2008, Petitioner filed a claim for workers’ compensation benefits that was subsequently approved by the Department of Labor’s Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP)(Resp. Exh. 5).
  3. Although Petitioner’s claim was approved by OWCP, she continued to work with modified duties until January 29, 2010, when she was told that modified duties were no longer available (Tr. 73).
  4. Petitioner remained on workers’ compensation until she secured a new position with the Social Security Administration in 2015 (Resp. Exh. 1; Tr. 67).
  5. On April 18, 2015, Petitioner transferred from the Postal Service to the Social Security Administration (Resp. Exh. 1; Tr. 21, 36, 44). 
  6. At the end of calendar year 2009, Petitioner was overdrawn in her annual leave by 12 hours (Resp. Exh. 6, p. 3; Tr. 16).
  7. By late January 2010, Petitioner was overdrawn in her annual leave balance by an additional 64.5 hours (Id.).
  8. The total of Petitioner’s negative leave balance at the end of January 2010 was 76.5 hours (Id.).
  9. Petitioner’s annual salary during the period in which she accumulated her negative leave balances was $53,102, or $25.5298 per hour.  Her overdrawn annual leave of 76.5 hours is calculated to be $1,953.03 (Tr. 57, 61).
  10. Respondent could not sufficiently explain why the amount sought in this case ($1,937.41) differs from the amount calculated above (Tr. 61-64).
  11. The Petition was timely filed.

DECISION

In a Debt Collection Act case, the Postal Service carries the burden of establishing that a debt exists.  Debbie Eccles, DCA 99-148 (August 26, 1999).  The obligation to meet that burden in a salary overpayment case requires the Postal Service to produce sufficient evidence that Petitioner owes the debt, and that the amount the Postal Service seeks to collect is an accurate calculation of the debt alleged.  In this case, the Postal Service did present sufficient evidence to establish that Petitioner was overdrawn in her annual leave balance by 76.5 hours.  However, it did not explain why the calculation of the debt did not support the amount sought (Finding 10).  However, because the amount sought is less than the actual calculation of the debt, the Postal Service may collect the lesser amount.

Petitioner argued that she is entitled to the benefit of an exception under the Employee and Labor Relations Manual (ELM) to the general rule that employees are obligated to repay overdrawn annual leave.  ELM Section 512.721 establishes the general rule that “[s]eparating employees who are indebted for unearned annual leave or sick leave must refund the amount paid to them for such unearned leave.”  However, an exception is provided for employees whose separation from the Postal Service is the result “of death or in the case of separation due to a disability that prevents an employee from returning to duty or continuing in the Postal Service” in which case the regulation states “[c]ollection is not required.”  ELM § 512.722.  Petitioner argues that her separation was the result of a disability that prevented her from continuing with the Postal Service, and that the exception cited here applies in her case.

The Postal Service objected to this defense and presented evidence that Petitioner was offered modified duty assignments after January 2010, but that Petitioner chose not to accept those assignments.  Petitioner responded that OWCP did not require her to accept the assignments thus proving that they did not meet her disability requirements.

I need not resolve this dispute, as I find that the exception provided under Section 512.722 is not mandatory in application.  Assuming Petitioner’s injury is the type of “disability” intended by the regulation, the operative phrase “[c]ollection is not required” suggests that collection of the debts referenced in Section 512.722 rests in the discretion of the Postal Service.  In this case, there is no evidence that Petitioner was treated differently than similarly situated employees, thus an argument of uneven or arbitrary application of the exception does not apply.  See, e.g., ELM § 511.1.  In the absence of any evidence that the Postal Service improperly decided not to apply Section 512.722, I cannot impose upon the Postal Service an obligation that does not exist.3

Accordingly, Respondent is entitled to judgment in its favor.

ORDER

The Petition is DENIED.  The Postal Service may collect the debt of $1,937.41 by administrative offset.

James G. Gilbert
Chief Administrative Law Judge

1 The undersigned Administrative Law Judge presided via telephone from the Judicial Officer Courtroom in Arlington, Virginia.

2 References to exhibits are abbreviated to “Resp. Exh. _” and “Pet. Exh. __” respectively. References to the transcript are abbreviated “Tr. __.”

3 This interpretation is consistent with the Debt Collection Act of 1982, Public Law No. 97-365, § 10, 97 Stat. 1749, 1754-1755 (1982). The Debt Collection Act of 1982 was passed with the intent to improve and expand upon the collection of debts owed to the United States. Id. It sets forth a system of collection that encourages agencies to collect money owed to the government, and also sets forth procedures, such as those employed in the instant case, to review the agency’s asserted debts. To read this regulation as a restriction on the agency’s ability to collect a debt would be inconsistent with the purpose of the Debt Collection Act of 1982, and I decline to adopt such an interpretation under the facts of this case.