November 25, 2019
PATRICK M. MURRAY v UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE
PSBCA Nos. 6635, 6640
APPEARANCE FOR APPELLANT:
Patrick M. Murray
APPEARANCE FOR RESPONDENT:
Peter J. McNulty Esq
United States Postal Service Law Department
OPINION OF THE BOARD
Patrick M. Murray had a contract to deliver mail for the Postal Service which the parties renewed in 2011. Mr. Murray claims that he is entitled to $25,793.60 because the Postal Service acted in bad faith by discriminating against him based on his age. We deny the claim and rule in favor of the Postal Service.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This decision is our third addressing the dispute between Mr. Murray and the Postal Service. In the first dispute, the Postal Service moved to dismiss because Mr. Murray sought damages, but refused to provide a sum certain as required by the Contract Disputes Act and binding precedent. We granted the motion and dismissed without prejudice. See Murray v. United States Postal Service, PSBCA No. 6603, 16-1 BCA ¶ 36,237.
Mr. Murray filed a new claim with the contracting officer seeking $72,351.56 in which he made two allegations. First, he alleged that he was entitled to $46,557.96 because he was required to provide rescreening information for himself and his drivers. We granted the Postal Service’s motion for summary judgment and denied this portion of the claim. See Murray v. United States Postal Service, PSBCA Nos. 6635, 6640,
18-1 BCA ¶ 37,058. Second, Mr. Murray alleged that the Postal Service negotiated his contract renewal in bad faith by discriminating against him because of his age, entitling him to an additional $25,793.60. Mr. Murray raised a genuine dispute as to a material fact which led us to deny that portion of the Postal Service’s motion for summary judgment. Id. We also granted the Postal Service’s motion for summary judgment as to $3,411.24 it inadvertently paid Mr. Murray for work he did not complete in January 2016 after the contract’s termination date.
We now address Mr. Murray’s remaining claim that he is entitled to damages because the Postal Service acted in bad faith during the negotiation process in 2011.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Background
Renewal Process
Renewal of Mr. Murray’s Contract
(AF 43 at 1,177, 1,182; Tr. 402-10).
Saturday, September 25, 2010 6 hrs 20 min.
Monday, September 27, 2010 6 hrs 15 min.
Tuesday, September 28, 2010 7 hrs. 30 min.
Wednesday, September 29, 2010 5 hrs. 42 min.
Thursday, September 30, 2010 7 hrs. 30 min.
Friday, October 1, 2010 6 hrs. 15 min.
The average for the six days was 6 hours and 36 minutes.4 (AF 43 at 1,177, 1,182; Tr. 402-10).
DECISION
Mr. Murray alleges that the Postal Service acted in bad faith during the contract renewal discussions by discriminating against him based on his age, which resulted in a substantially lower contract rate. Mr. Murray argues that the Postal Service’s bad faith entitles him to contract reformation which would increase his contract price by $25,793.60 over the relevant performance period. See Lee’s Ford Dock, Inc. v. Secretary of the Army, 865 F.3d 1361, 1368-69 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Samuel J. Tibbs, PSBCA No. 1523, 86-3 BCA ¶ 19,074. Previously, in ruling on the Postal Service’s motion for summary judgment in this case, we allowed for the possibility that age discrimination could amount to bad faith, and thus be an “invalidating cause” supporting contract reformation. See Murray, 18-1 BCA ¶ 37,058; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 214(d)(negotiations may be used to establish illegality, duress, or other invalidating cause).
In order to prevail, Mr. Murray must show by clear and convincing evidence that the contracting officer or some other Postal Service official acted with malice or specific intent to harm him because of his age. Am-Pro Protective Agency, Inc. v. United States, 281 F.3d 1234, 1240 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Finley v. United States Postal Service, PSBCA No. 6606, 17-1 BCA ¶ 36,676; Bowles v. United States, 144 Fed. Cl. 240 (2019)(a postmaster’s false allegations of assault by the contractor shows bad faith). We are permitted to hear such allegations only to the extent that a party alleges bad faith and there is a logical nexus between the bad faith and a contract provision or performance. See Innovative Tel. Servs., Inc. v. Dept. of Veterans Affairs, CBCA No. 12, 07-2 BCA ¶ 33,685.
Mr. Murray relies on a series of facts which when considered as a whole, he argues, show a specific intent to harm him because of his age. Specifically, Mr. Murray argues: (1) the Postal Service mistreated him during the contract renewal negotiations; (2) the Postal Service improperly ignored his past performance record; and (3) the Postal Service treated him differently than similarly situated, but younger, contractors working out of the Cottonwood Post Office.
Treatment By Postal Service Employees During Contract Negotiations
Mr. Murray raises a series of arguments that his treatment by the Postal Service’s employees shows bad faith in the form of age discrimination. To prove bad faith, Mr. Murray must show by clear and convincing evidence that the Postal Service had a specific intent to harm him. He must also overcome the presumption that Postal Service employees acted in good faith. Am-Pro Protective Agency, Inc., 281 F.3d at 1239-40; Murray, 18-1 B.C.A. ¶ 37,058; Finley, 17-1 BCA ¶ 36,676.
We address each of Mr. Murray’s arguments. Specifically, he argues that during contract negotiations, he was treated with disrespect because of his age. He asserts, for example, that the contract specialist spoke gruffly to him. Mr. Murray also points to the fact that the contract specialist used the phrase “take it or leave it” during discussions and said that if Mr. Murray did not accept the price offered by the Postal Service, it would compete the contract. We believe Mr. Murray’s testimony that the contract specialist made these statements, but do not believe the statements prove bad faith. Cf. Falmouth Scientific, Inc., ASBCA No. 60776, 19-1 BCA ¶ 37,389 (in the context of an allegation of a breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, a contracting officer’s take it or leave it statement did not support a finding that the duty was breached), citing Metcalf Const. Co. v. United States, 742 F.3d 984, 990-91 (Fed. Cir. 2014); cf. Southern Def. Sys., Inc., ASBCA No. 54045, 12-1 BCA ¶ 34,949 (contracting officer stating that government was not obligated to award additional work to this contract was not bad faith).
During the summer of 2011, the contract specialist was responsible for the renewal of 90 contracts. These agreements had to be completed by June 30 to avoid a break in mail delivery service. Having reviewed the emails and heard testimony from both Mr. Murray and the contract specialist, we agree that the negotiations may have been gruff and curt. Falmouth Scientific, Inc., 19-1 BCA ¶ 37,389 (the contractor did not identify any law or contract clause which precluded hard-nosed negotiations); 6800 Corp., GSBCA No. 5880, 83-2 BCA ¶ 16,581 (“A lack of good faith bargaining may not be found merely because a party attempts to secure that which the other party deems unacceptable . . . .”); see generally J. Harley, Economic Duress and Unconscionability: How Fair Must the Government Be?, 18 Pub. Con. L.J. 76 (Oct. 1988). But we also believe the Postal Service acted reasonably during the negotiations under the circumstances. Furthermore, the statements relied on by Mr. Murray do not show a specific intent to harm him because of his age. The Postal Service was merely trying to get the best possible bargain given the particular circumstances of this contract renewal. In light of the reduced mail volume and time necessary to perform the route each day, we do not believe the Postal Service acted in bad faith when it negotiated a reduced rate.
Moreover, the Postal Service’s hard bargaining was reasonable given the reduced mail volume and time to complete the route. Hard bargaining is bad faith when not supported by a reasonable basis. See, e.g., Allied Materials and Equip. Co., Inc., ASBCA No. 17318, 75-1 BCA ¶ 11,150. However, such is not the case here. Declining mail volume provided a reasonable basis to seek a price reduction. See AFR v. Department of Housing and Urban Development, CBCA No. 946, 09-2 BCA ¶ 34,226 (an unsupported allegation of bad faith will not obviate a clear reasonable basis for a specific contract action); Pennyrile Plumbing, Inc., ASBCA No. 44555, 96-1 BCA ¶ 28,044 (even the existence of animus towards a contractor by government officials cannot obviate a clear reasonable basis for a discretionary decision); Highland Al Hujaz Co., Ltd., ASBCA No. 58243, 16-1 BCA ¶ 36,336 (in reviewing whether there is bad faith, we will look to see whether there was a reasonable basis for the decision; the degree of discretion reposed in the contracting officer, and whether applicable laws have been followed).
Mr. Murray also complains that the contracting officer never responded to his request for a telephone conference during negotiations. At the time, the contracting officer was covering ten different states and working in an understaffed office. He reasonably believed the request for the call was moot once Mr. Murray signed the contract. The record thus does not show that the contracting officer refused to speak to Mr. Murray because of his age.
Mr. Murray also argues that the Postal Service failed to review his contract file carefully. First, there is no evidence, other than Mr. Murray’s unsupported allegation, that the Postal Service failed to carefully review his contract file. Second, Mr. Murray does not demonstrate how, even if true, failure to review the contract file establishes a specific intent to harm him because of his age.
Mr. Murray further argues that the Postal Service mistreated him by providing “false, fabricated, and fake data” in the route survey. For example, Mr. Murray argues that the postmaster lied about the time needed to complete the route.5 The evidence simply does support these assertions. The mileage for the new contract, 50.5 miles a day, was the same as the old contract. Mr. Murray also does not explain how an overall reduction in mail volume would not result in a reduction in the amount of time needed to perform the contract. More significantly, Mr. Murray did not present any evidence to show the six-day average of 6 hours and 36 minutes in the route survey was wrong. Further, all the survey times were less than the prior contract rate of 7 hours and 56 minutes. Simply put, Mr. Murray provides no evidence that the route survey data is false, fabricated, or fake.
Finally, Mr. Murray contends that the contract specialist, in his June 13, 2011 Renewal Memorandum, agreed that Mr. Murray was mistreated. In relaying Mr. Murray’s complaint to the contracting officer that the price reduction was unfair, the contract specialist agreed by saying: “He has a point!” While that may have been the contract specialist’s opinion, it is not sufficient to support Mr. Murray’s bad faith argument—especially given the reduction of mail volume and reduction in time needed to complete the route. The Postal Service, therefore, provided a reasonable basis for reducing the price, thereby defeating Mr. Murray’s assertion of age discrimination.
Past Performance
Mr. Murray argues that, during the renewal negotiations, the Postal Service failed to consider his excellent past performance. If it had done so, Mr. Murray believes he would have received a higher annual rate under the new contract. For its part, the Postal Service does not dispute Mr. Murray’s characterization of his past performance.
The issue before us, however, is not Mr. Murray’s past performance, or even the Postal Service’s failure to consider it. The issue before us is whether that failure amounted to bad faith. To answer that question, we begin by noting that Mr. Murray has not alleged that the Postal Service was legally required to consider his past performance. He has not referred us to any statute or regulation mandating such a review. He has also failed to point out any law or regulation requiring the Postal Service to pay a higher rate based on past performance. In the absence of such legal requirements, we see no reason to find that the Postal Service’s conduct amounted to bad faith.
Alleged Age Discrimination During the Renewal Process
Eight Cottonwood Post Office contracts for delivery service were renewed in June 2011. As Mr. Murray tells it: “So out of the eight routes that went through renewal in 2011, it was [the] two old guys that got socked approximately $12,000 combined. The six other contractors, all under the age of 60, lost a combined amount of approximately $4,285. . . . This to me, clearly shows age discrimination." (Tr. 28-29).
We begin by noting that six of the eight contractors at the Cottonwood Post Office were over 40 years old, meaning that they, like Mr. Murray, were members of a protected class for purposes of federal law. See, e.g., Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34. In this case, however, Mr. Murray is not relying on that statute as a basis for his age discrimination claim. Instead, he is relying on the more general idea that the other contractors who were younger than him were treated more favorably during the renewal process in 2011. We will examine Mr. Murray’s claim in that context.
With regard to the renewal letters, he argues that because there were slight differences in the language, he received disparate treatment. While there were two different form letters, all of them referenced the Postal Service’s dire financial condition as a reason for changes in the upcoming contract. The letter that Mr. Murray received also stated that reduced mail volume would lead to reduced contract hours. In and of itself, this statement does not show age discrimination. Furthermore, while Mr. Murray along with the contractor composed of the father (80 years old) and son (48 years old) team received the letter, two other contractors who were 39 and 50 also received the letter. Mr. Murray has not shown that age was the reason for receiving the renewal letter which referenced reduced mail volume.6
For example, Mr. Murray argues that Contractor A, who was 39 years old when her contract was renewed, had her contract cut by 323 hours a year, yet her annual rate remained the same at $34,728.98. In comparison, Mr. Murray’s contract was cut by 314 hours a year and his price was cut by $5,723. Mr. Murray attributes the disparate treatment to their age difference.
The Postal Service responds by explaining that it did a survey for Contractor A’s route, comparing miles, number of boxes, and mail volume for that route with several hundred contractors in TCSS. Based on this comparison, it determined that, even with the reduced hours, her rate was competitive and no change was recommended during the renewal process. When the Postal Service ran the same comparison for Mr. Murray’s contract, however, it determined that his rate was too high and therefore needed to be reduced. We find the survey results credible and persuasive. We thus agree with the Postal Service’s argument that age did not enter into its survey calculations for either contract.
Mr. Murray also cites the renewal of Contractor E, who was 80 years old, to support his age discrimination claim. Like Mr. Murray’s rate, Contractor E’s rate was also cut. Contractor E’s rate was cut by $6,161.34, and Mr. Murray’s rate was cut by $5,723. The evidence, however, does not support this argument.
First, Contractor E was originally run by a father and son business. The son was 48 years old at the time of renewal in 2011, and he was performing the contract by himself as his father had retired. His father was not actively participating in the contract, though he may have had minor involvement with the business. This evidence establishes that the Postal Service cut the contract rate for a contract being performed by someone much younger than Mr. Murray, thereby undermining Mr. Murray’s argument.
Second, the Postal Service again explained that it used TCSS to compare miles, number of boxes, and mail volume with several hundred other contractors. And age was not a variable in the comparison. Based on this comparison, the Postal Service sought a price reduction during renewal negotiations. Seeking a price reduction based on miles, number of boxes, and mail volume was reasonable and does not prove age discrimination.
ORDER
The appeals are denied. Mr. Murray has not proved that the Postal Service has discriminated against him based on his age.
Peter F Pontzer
Administrative Judge
Board Member
Alan R Caramella
Administrative Judge
Acting Chairman
Diane M Mego
Administrative Judge
Board Member
1 For Mr. Murray’s contract, the results of Mr. Murray’s route survey will be discussed below.
2 The Postal Service produced the contract files for the eight contractors (AF 39-46). AF 39 does not include a renewal letter for one of the contractors.
3 The record also referred to the contract specialist as a “purchasing analyst,” a “transportation contract specialist,” “renewal specialist,” and “contract specialist.” For consistency, we use “contract specialist.”
4 In tracking the time to complete each activity, the postmaster converted the total to two significant decimal places (for example, 6 hours and 15 minutes became 6.25 hours). In converting to decimal places the average became 6.59 hours. Instead of rounding down to 6 hours and 35 minutes, the postmaster rounded up to 6 hours and 36 minutes. (Tr. 474-75).
5 “For the Postmaster to ‘play God’ with Appellant’s financial life, his very existence, by blithely stat[ing] she would be ‘comfortable with 80 minutes’ per day being improperly shaved off Appellant’s contract . . . was unconscionable and it was malicious in its result.” See Appellant’s Post Hearing Reply Brief at 7.
6 During the hearing, Mr. Murray explained that mail was sorted in a warehouse like building near the Cottonwood Post Office. Half of the contractors would sort on the left side of the building and half on the right side of the building. Mr. Murray argued that contractors on one side were treated differently than those on the other, but provided no evidence or argument that the treatment was based on age. (Tr. 34-35).