September 18, 2020
MARK VII ENTERPRISES, INC. v. UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE
PSBCA No. 6814
APPEARANCE FOR APPELLANT
Donald G. Furlow, Esq.
Mark VII Enterprises, Inc.
APPEARANCE FOR RESPONDENT
Barbara H. Cioffi, Esq.
United States Postal Service Law Department
OPINION OF THE BOARD
The United States Postal Service contracted with Mark VII Enterprises, Inc. “Mark VII” to refurbish a department store to serve as a post office. Mark VII claims entitlement to $85,547 it paid a subcontractor to install a closed circuit television “CCTV” system because the specifications provided that it would be purchased using the pass through pricing process. The solicitation did not describe the process. The Postal Service denied the claim because the contract type was firm, fixed-price which made Mark VII responsible for subcontracting costs. Mark VII did not ask the contracting officer about the patently ambiguous specification before bid submission; therefore, the ambiguity is not construed against the Postal Service. Mark VII is not entitled to the additional $85,547.1
FINDINGS OF FACT
CONTRACT TYPE
AF 6 at 811. Without explanation, the word “competitive” was dropped.
C. Direct Vendor items in this contract are limited to specific items, as shown in the drawings and listed below:
AF 1 at 10-11.
1. All equipment including the servers, monitors, network switch, etc. are to be procured directly from the Direct Vendor (Securitas Electronic Security) utilizing the pass through pricing process.
2. The cameras, servers, monitors and associated equipment shall be supplied and installed by Securitas Electronic Security, Inc. the sole approved USPS CCTV Direct Vendor. The Direct Vendor is to provide a Bill of Materials, pricing, and installation costs. The General Contractor is responsible for power, conduit, cable tray, cable and cable pulling.
The specification did not identify whether Mark VII should include the price for the CCTV system in its offer. The term “pass through pricing process” is not defined in this specification section or elsewhere in specifications. The term pass through pricing process is only used this one time in the specifications. AF 1 at 434, emphasis added.
DECISION
Mark VII argues that the contract was not ambiguous and that the plain language relating to the CCTV contractor, Securitas, makes the Postal Service liable for the cost because the CCTV system was a “pass through” item. In the alternative, Mark VII argues that if the specifications were ambiguous, the ambiguity was latent, and the ambiguity should be construed against the Postal Service, which drafted the specifications.
If the contract is ambiguous, Mark VII must show: (1) that it had a reasonable interpretation of the specifications, (2) that if the ambiguity was patent, it inquired about the ambiguity before bidding, or, alternatively, that the ambiguity was latent, and (3) that the ambiguity should be construed against the Postal Service as the drafter of the specifications i.e., contra proferentum. See United Pac. Ins., Co. v. United States, 497 F.2d 1402, 1407 (Ct. Cl. 1974); West Bay Builders v. United States, 85 Fed. Cl. 1, 13-17 200); see also John Cibinic, Jr., James F. Nagle, Ralph C. Nash, Jr., Administration of Government Contracts, 211-26 5th ed. 2016.
The specifications were ambiguous.
A contract is ambiguous when there are two reasonable interpretations of the contract language. Metric Constructors, Inc. v. National Aeronautics & Space Admin., 169 F.3d 747, 751 Fed. Cir. 1999. “A contract is ambiguous only if it is susceptible to differing interpretations, each consistent with the contract’s language.” H.B. Zachry Co. v. United States, 28 Fed. Cl. 77, 80 1993, aff’d without opinion, 17 F.3d 1443 Fed. Cir. 1994.
Mark VII argues that the contract is not ambiguous, relying on the Postal Service’s specific language for the CCTV system requiring the use of the “pass through pricing process.” In comparison, Mark VII points to the sections of the solicitation for postal signage and postal casework which specifically instructed the bidders to include the costs for those items in their bids.
Mark VII therefore believes that “pass through pricing” is clear on its face and is substantially different than other sections of the solicitation requiring offerors to include the costs for Direct Vendor items in their bids. Mark VII also knew that the Postal Service had a requirements contract with Securitas, which meant that the Postal Service would order its CCTV systems directly from Securitas. Mark VII thus believed that any costs for Securitas would be the same for all of the bidders. Mark VII therefore believed it did not need to include this cost in its bid.
The Postal Service has not explained—either in the solicitation or during this litigation—why there were three approaches in the solicitation to Direct Vendor items: (1) specifically telling offerors to include the cost in the bid for postal signage and postal casework, (2) telling offerors to use the pass through pricing process for the CCTV system, and (3) remaining silent on whether to include the cost for traffic doors and the dock lift. Mark VII reasoned that because the language was different, the treatment of the different Direct Vendor items should be different. Mark VII’s interpretation is reasonable based on a plain reading of the words “pass through pricing,” its knowledge that Securitas had a requirements contract, the different language used with other Direct Vendor sections, and wanting to give this different language meaning.
On the other hand, the Postal Service argues that the solicitation was clear in its requirement that Mark VII pay for the CCTV system. The Postal Service relies on the language identifying the contract as being firm, fixed price. The solicitation states that Mark VII must provide all material, labor, tools, plant, supplies, equipment, transportation, superintendence, temporary construction of every nature, and all other services and facilities necessary to construct the build-out system and that Mark VII was responsible for contracting with [Securitas] and ordering, payment, receiving, accepting, storage and installation of the CCTV system. Additionally, Mark VII signed the affirmation that it included all costs in its bid price. The affirmation did not exclude the CCTV system from the bid price. This interpretation of the solicitation indicates that Mark VII would be liable for the CCTV system costs. Based on this language, the Postal Service’s interpretation is also reasonable.
The Postal Service points to an explanation on its website, USPS Suppliers, entitled Pass Through Pricing for suppliers.8 The Postal Service argues that this website resolves any potential ambiguity and that no further review is needed.9
This argument has several problems. First, this website was not incorporated into the solicitation by reference or even referenced in the solicitation. Second, the website is not a regulation which was properly promulgated and published in the Code of Federal Regulations. Anything said on the website was thus not binding for this acquisition. Third, the website is opaque and does not answer the question at issue here. The website doesn’t say that an offeror should include in the offer the cost for a Direct Vendor when using pass through pricing. Fourth, the website lists 15 suppliers in the Pass Through Pricing program. Securitas is not one of them. The Postal Service’s argument that the website makes the specification clear is unpersuasive.10
Given these facts, the contract specifications are ambiguous as to whether Mark VII should have included the cost for the CCTV system in its bid price.
The ambiguity was patent.
A patent ambiguity is present when the contract contains facially inconsistent provisions that would place a reasonable contactor on notice and prompt the contractor to rectify the inconsistency by inquiring of the appropriate parties.” K-Con, Inc. v. Secretary of the Army, 908 F.3d 719, 722 Fed. Cir. 2018 quoting Stratos Mobile Networks USA, LLC v. United States, 213 F.3d 1375, 1381 Fed. Cir. 2000. A patent ambiguity must be “obvious, gross, or glaring.” NVT Tech., Inc. v. United States, 370 F.3d 1153, 1162 Fed. Cir. 2004 quoting H & M Moving, Inc. v. United States, 499 F.2d 660, 671 Ct. Cl. 1974.
Before submitting its bid, Mark VII did not ask the contracting officer a single question. It now argues that it didn’t ask any questions because the ambiguity was latent, i.e., neither glaring, substantial, nor patently obvious. K-Con, 908 F.3d at 722. Mark VII cites to several facts to support this argument. The Project Manual i.e., statement of work containing the detailed specifications is 453 pages long. The work relating to the CCTV system is covered in just three of those pages. The phrase pass through pricing process only appears once in those 453 pages. The term does not obviously conflict with the rest of the solicitation. Furthermore, because the solicitation was only out for a month, finding such an item and focusing on it would have been impossible. The argument that the ambiguity is latent is not persuasive because Mark VII took a very different action for the CCTV system than the other Direct Vendor items. It knew of the different language.
In contrast, the Postal Service identified the contract type as being firm, fixed price. A firm, fixed-price contract requires the buyer to pay the seller a definite and predetermined price regardless of increases in the seller’s cost or buyer’s ability to acquire the same goods in the market at a lower price. Black’s Law Dictionary 11th ed. 2019. In addition, the solicitation clearly provided: The Contractor must provide all material, labor, tools, plant, supplies, equipment, transportation, superintendence, temporary construction of every nature, and all other services and facilities necessary to construct the build-out system, in accordance with USPS approved specifications and drawings. Mr. Santo even affirmed that the bid was “inclusive of all costs associated with the scope of work.
Under these circumstances, the conflict between including the CCTV system cost and not including the cost under Mark VII’s reading of the pass through pricing process was obvious. The solicitation terms were facially inconsistent and thus patently ambiguous. States Roofing Corp. v. Winter, 587 F.3d 1364, 1372 Fed. Cir. 2009. Because the ambiguity was patent, this Board does not reach Mark VII’s argument that the latent ambiguity should be construed against Postal Service as the specification’s drafter.
Mark VII had a duty to inquire.
The ambiguity was patent. So patent, in fact, that Mr. Santo conducted a Google search to try to understand the meaning of Direct Vendor and that term’s relationship to pass through pricing. But for unexplained reasons, he did not ask the contracting officer about those terms before submitting his bid. Additionally, Mark VII’s bid included Mr. Santo’s affirmation that: All discrepancies omissions and/or conflicts within the solicitation that might have implications of cost and/or schedule have been made known to the Contracting Officer by the Offeror in writing. Mr. Santo’s affirmation is important because it shows that he understood and accepted the duty to inquire. If the ambiguity is obvious and the bidder fails to inquire with regard to the provision, his interpretation will fail. NVT Tech., 370 F.3d at 1162.
Mark VII failed to inquire about a patent ambiguity. Therefore, its interpretation which makes the Postal Service liable for the CCTV cost also fails.
ORDER
The appeal is denied. The Postal Service does not owe Mark VII $85,547.
Peter F. Pontzer
Administrative Judge
Board Member
1 This case was brought using the Board’s Expedited Procedures. 39 C.F.R. § 955.13. Written decisions using these procedures will include summary findings and are nonprecedential. Additionally, at the parties’ request, this case is being decided based on the written record.
2 Numbered exhibits submitted by the Postal Service in the Appeal File are identified as “AF ___”. Lettered exhibits submitted by Mark VII are in the Appellant’s Appeal File Supplement and are identified as “App. AF ___.”
3 The Postal Service’s acquisition regulations do not define a “Firm, Fixed Price Competitive” contract nor do they explain how this contract type allocates risk between the Postal Service and a contractor. 39 C.F.R. Part 601.
4 As noted in the solicitation, the Postal Service is not bound by the Federal Acquisition Regulations. Federal Acquisition Regulation 16.202-1 which provides “[t]his contract type places upon the contractor maximum risk and full responsibility for all costs and resulting profit or loss” does not apply. Instead, the Postal Service has Supplying Principles and Practices (June 2020) (found at https://about.usps.com/manuals/spp/html/welcome.htm), which state: “These guidelines are intended for internal use only . . . .” and, furthermore, do not define “firm, fixed price contract,” “Direct Vendor,” or “pass through pricing process.”
5 The first two digits in the Section number show the Division number.
6 The requirements contract was novated from Diebold Inc.to Securitas in 2016. The Securitas contract was in effect when the solicitation was issued and later when Mark VII submitted its offer. (AF 9 at 1018-20; AF 13).
7 The Schedule of Values does not closely track the section in the specifications (compare AF 1 at 20 to AF 1 at 424-65).
8 See https://about.usps.com/suppliers/pass-through-pricing.htm#:~:text=To%20promote%20standardization%20and%20reduce,what%20they%20would%20pay%20independently.&text=Contact%20the%20PTP%20supplier%20directly%20to%20obtain%20leveraged%20prices. (Last viewed August 17, 2020).
9 This argument is further advanced by the contracting officer in her declaration (AF 13).
10 Even if it were listed, for the sake of argument, “[a] contractor should not be required to wade through a maze . . . to find out what the government requires in an invitation for bids. This is especially true . . . where the requirements could have been clearly specified by the use of a half dozen ordinary words . . . .” Gorn Corp v. United States, 424 F.2d 588, 592 (Ct. Cl 1970). Seven words (“In the offer, include the cost for”) which were included for signage and casework could have avoided the ambiguity and this litigation.