June 26, 2000
In the Matter of the Petition by
BRENDA C. RILEY
4203 San Marcos Road
at
Louisville, KY 40299-1405
P.S Docket No. DCA 00-112
APPEARANCE FOR PETITIONER: Charles Scialla
453 Preakness Avenue, #5
Paterson, NJ 07502-1121
APPEARANCE FOR RESPONDENT: Mera E. Cole-Hayden
Labor Relations Specialist
United States Postal Service
320 Whittington Parkway, Suite 302
Louisville, KY 40222-7972
FINAL DECISION UNDER THE DEBT COLLECTION ACT OF 1982
Petitioner, Brenda Riley, filed a timely Petition for a hearing under the Debt Collection Act, 5 U.S.C. §5514(a), after receiving a Notice of Involuntary Administrative Salary Offsets on March 17, 2000. This Notice stated the Postal Service's intention to withhold $770.06 from her salary to recover an overpayment of salary between August 1998 and July 1999.
A hearing was held in Louisville, Kentucky on May 23, 2000.(1) The Postal Service presented testimony from Terry Cooper, Petitioner's supervisor, Ronald Roberts, Petitioner's second line supervisor, Barbara Brown, who issued the Notice of Involuntary Administrative Salary Offsets, Paula Howard, a finance supervisor, and Ronald Langevin, District Manager of Finance. Petitioner testified in her own behalf, and also presented testimony from Jack Barnett, an employee who had formerly received night differential pay. Both parties also relied on documents that had been filed with the Petition and the Answer. Each side presented two additional documents at the hearing. The following findings of fact are based on the entire record, including observation of the witnesses and their demeanor.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Petitioner is a directory analysis specialist at the United States Postal Service Processing and Distribution Center in Louisville, Kentucky. This involves working with the computer system database that runs the automated mail sorting and distribution for the Kentuckiana District. (Tr. 104).(2)
2. For several years prior to August 1998, Petitioner's duty hours were from 3 a.m. to 11:30 a.m. (Tr. 11, 104). In July 1998, Petitioner's supervisor, Mr. Cooper, told her that her hours were to be changed to 8:30 a.m. to 5 p.m., effective August 8, 1998. Mr. Cooper sent Petitioner an e-mail message confirming this on July 29, 1998. (Tr. 12-14, 105, 108; Answer, Ex. 3).
3. Petitioner did not agree with the reasons for the change in hours, but since August 8, 1998, she has worked the new hours. In order to accomplish her job, she has occasionally had to work evening or early morning hours. (Tr. 105-09).
4. "Night differential" is a form of premium pay that is paid to eligible employees who work between 6 p.m. and 6 a.m. as part or all of their normal schedule. The applicable rules are found in PS Handbook F-21, Time and Attendance, §241, and in the Employee and Labor Relations Manual (ELM), §434.2. (Answer, Ex. 7 and Ex. 8; PS Ex. 1 and Ex. 2). "Night differential is not payable when service performed is in addition to the normal service day." ELM §434.223.
5. Petitioner is an employee eligible to receive night differential, and did receive it for three hours each day when her duty hours began at 3 a.m. After her hours changed to 8:30 a.m. to 5 p.m. on August 8, 1998, she was no longer entitled to receive night differential. For reasons that are not clear, however, the necessary change in the payroll system was not made, and she continued to receive night differential until pay period 14 (July) of 1999.
6. When the error was discovered, the night differential pay was stopped, and Petitioner was issued a Letter of Debt Determination on January 5, 2000, to recoup 564 hours of night differential pay. She requested reconsideration, which was denied on February 15, 2000, and the Notice of Involuntary Administrative Salary Offsets was issued on March 16, 2000. (Answer, Exs. 1-4).
DECISION
Petitioner does not dispute the fact that her scheduled hours were changed, or that she continued to be paid night differential after she was no longer working the night hours. Nor does she dispute the number of hours in issue - 564. She contends that she should not have to repay the money because this was a Postal Service error that should have been corrected long ago if various postal officials had done their jobs properly. She also contends that she was "singled out" for repayment even though some others have not been required to repay night differential pay to which they were not entitled.
Respondent's position is simply that administrative errors that result in an overpayment to an employee do not entitle the employee to keep the overpayment.
There is no question that Petitioner's duty hours were changed, and that as a result of that change her regular duty hours after August 8, 1998 did not entitle her to night differential pay. The fact that she occasionally worked some night hours does not change her entitlement. The rules cited above (Finding of Fact #4) make this clear. The fact that she did not cause the error, or that postal officials were slow in discovering and correcting it, does not relieve her of the obligation to pay back an overpayment. The other cases she points to in arguing that she was singled out are not relevant here. The evidence presented at the hearing as to those cases was either that those individuals requested waivers of their indebtedness and that waivers were granted, or that the cases were not factually similar to Petitioner's. As was made clear to all parties at the hearing, a waiver request is something entirely separate from this proceeding. A Debt Collection Act Hearing Official has no authority to grant a waiver, or to direct any postal official to grant, or deny, a waiver. This decision expresses no opinion as to whether waivers were appropriate in other cases, or whether a waiver would be appropriate in Petitioner's case.
Respondent has shown by a preponderance of evidence that Petitioner was overpaid in the amount alleged, and Petitioner has shown no basis for finding that she is not indebted to the Postal Service. The Petition is denied. Respondent may collect $770.06 from Petitioner's salary.
Bruce R. Houston
Chief Administrative Law Judge
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1 The hearing was held jointly with two other cases, DCA 00-113 and DCA 00-114, which presented similar issues and involved many of the same witnesses. Separate decisions are being issued in the three cases.
2 Reference is to the hearing transcript. References to the tabbed exhibits attached to Respondent's Answer will be Answer, Ex. _. References to documents introduced at the hearing will be PS. Ex. _, or Pet. Ex. _.