In the Matter of a Mail Dispute Between

DANIEL SAGER, ESQ.
and
JOANNE SAVAGE, ESQ.

P.S. Docket No. MD 10-189

APPEARANCE FOR DISPUTANT
DANIEL SAGER, ESQ.:
James Duarte, Esq.
DUARTE & ASSOCIATES

APPEARANCE FOR DISPUTANT
JOANNE SAVAGE, ESQ.:
Robert P. Weiss, Esq
NARVID SCOTT, LLP

INITIAL DECISION

            This mail dispute has been docketed pursuant to Postal Operations Manual (POM) §616.21 (July 2002), which requires Postal Service Counsel to forward certain unresolved mail disputes to the Judicial Officer for resolution.  The mail in dispute is that addressed to “Sager & Savage,” or “Sager, Savage, & Finete,” 5152 Kitella Avenue, Suite 104, Las Alamitos, California 90720-2841, and to P.O. Box 5849, Garden Grove, California 92846-0849.[1]  The mail at both locations is being held by the local postmasters pending resolution of this mail dispute.  The undersigned Administrative Law Judge presided at a hearing held on November 16 and 17, 2010, in Santa Ana, California.  These findings are based upon the entire record, including prior submittals, testimony, exhibits admitted at trial, and the post-trial briefs of the parties.      

FINDINGS OF FACT

            1.                  Sager & Savage, A Professional Law Corporation (hereinafter “Sager & Savage”) is a corporation organized on January 31, 2000, under the laws of the state of California (Sager Exh. 7).[2]

            2.                  Disputant Daniel Sager is President of Sager & Savage and owns stock in the corporation amounting to a 50% interest in ownership (Tr., Vol. 1, pp. 33-34, 235; Savage Exh. 1; Sager Exh. 8).[3]

            3.                  Disputant Joanne Savage is Secretary/Treasurer of Sager & Savage and owns stock in the corporation amounting to a 50% interest in ownership (Id.).

            4.                  In October 2009, Sager & Savage changed its name to Sager, Savage, & Finete, A Professional Law Corporation (hereinafter “Sager, Savage & Finete”) organized under the laws of the state of California, however ownership of the corporation and its existing officers and directors remained unchanged (Sager Exh. 8).

            5.                  The parties stipulate that prior to January 21, 2010, Disputant Sager served as President of Sager, Savage, and Finete (Tr., Vol. 1, p. 157; Tr., Vol. 2, p. 120). 

            6.                  On January 21, 2010, Disputant Savage and Disputant Sager engaged in a heated argument at the offices of Sager, Savage, & Finete that led to Disputant Sager’s decision to leave the premises (Tr., Vol. 1, pp. 48-49, 187-188).

            7.                  On that day, Disputant Sager took with him a computer data hard drive that contained information relative to the operation of the law firm, including client files, financial information, and other law firm confidential material (Tr., Vol. 1, pp. 188, 278-280; Tr. Vol. 2, pp. 181-182).

            8.                  Subsequent to his departure, Disputant Sager made a copy of the hard drive (Tr., Vol. 1, p. 280).

            9.                  On January 22, 2010, Disputant Sager returned the original hard drive to the law office by leaving it outside the door of the office suite (Id.; Tr., Vol. 2, p. 189).

            10.             In an electronic mail communication from Disputant Sager to Disputant Savage on February 4, 2010, Disputant Sager informed Disputant Savage, inter alia, that “in the end I want you and only you to have the firm” (Savage Exh. 4). 

            11.             From January 21, 2010, until March 10, 2010, Disputant Savage managed the day-to-day operations of the Sager, Savage & Finete law firm (Tr., Vol. 1, pp. 72, 191).

            12.             Since January 21, 2010, with the exception of retrieving the hard drive from the premises of the law firm a second time on or about March 11, 2010, Disputant Sager has not returned to the law firm’s offices, nor has he engaged in client related business other than two minor matters (Tr., Vol. 1, pp. 146, 160-161, 189; Tr., Vol. 2, pp. 20-21).

            13.             On March 11, 2010, Disputant Savage and Attorney Finete formed a new law firm, Savage Finete, A Professional Law Corporation (hereinafter “Savage Finete”) organized under the laws of the state of California (Tr., Vol. 1, pp. 70-71; Savage Exh. 6).

            14.             Since March 11, 2010, Disputant Savage and Attorney James Finete operated the new law firm under the name Savage Finete at the same street address as Sager, Savage, & Finete, but in a different suite located on the second floor (Tr., Vol. 1, p. 79).

            15.             Sometime after the creation of Savage Finete on March 11, 2010, a representative of Savage Finete opened a post office box located in Garden Grove, California, which is one of the subject locations of this mail dispute, namely P.O. Box 5849, Garden Grove, California 92846-0849 (“P.O. Box 5849”) (Tr., Vol. 1, p. 119).

            16.             In April 2010, a dispute arose between the parties regarding delivery of the mail addressed to 5152 Kitella Avenue, Suite 104, Las Alamitos, California (“Suite 104”) (Tr., Vol. 1, pp. 84, 149, 195; Savage Exh. 7).

            17.             As the result of this dispute, mail addressed to any occupant at Suite 104 was held by the Las Alamitos postmaster commencing on April 20, 2010 (Savage Exh. 7).

            18.             On that same date, the Las Alamitos postmaster notified the parties to this mail dispute that any mail addressed to Sager, Savage, & Finete with a mailing address to P.O. Box 5849 also would be subject to withholding until resolution of the mail dispute (Id.).

            19.             Sometime after April 16, 2010, the Las Alamitos postmaster referred the mail dispute to Respondent’s field counsel for resolution in accordance with POM §616.21 (Transmittal Letter from field counsel to Judicial Officer dated July 9, 2010 (“Transmittal Letter”)).

            20.             Field counsel corresponded with both parties during June 2010 in an attempt to resolve the mail dispute (Id.).

            21.             On July 1, 2010, field counsel received a faxed letter signed by Disputant Savage releasing the mail to Disputant Sager (Tr., Vol. 1, p. 19; Savage Exh 8). 

            22.             In reliance upon this letter, field counsel instructed the Las Alamitos postmaster to release the mail to Disputant Sager (Id.). 

            23.             This release of mail was done on Wednesday, July 7, 2010 (Id.). 

            24.             On July 8, 2010, field counsel received a call from Disputant Savage, who claimed that she had not sent the letter dated July 1, 2010, and that her signature was forged (Id.). 

            25.             Since July 8, 2010, all mail addressed to Suite 104 has been held by the Las Alamitos postmaster on advice of field counsel where it remains pending resolution of this dispute (Transmittal Letter).

            26.             Also on July 8, 2010, at the direction of Disputant Sager, an attempt was made by a third party to negotiate checks at Wells Fargo Bank which were the same checks contained in the previously disputed mail delivered to Disputant Sager on July 7, 2010 (Tr., Vol. 1, pp. 88-90, 93-94, 202-203, 226-227).

            27.             Wells Fargo Bank did not accept the checks for deposit (Tr., Vol.  1, p. 90).

            28.             Shortly thereafter, the checks referred to above were deposited by Disputant Sager into an account at Bank of America that he established that day on behalf of Sager, Savage, & Finete (Tr., Vol. 2, p. 56).

            29.             Prior to the hearing date, Disputant Sager expended all the funds deposited into the Bank of America account that he created on behalf of Sager, Savage, & Finete (Tr., Vol. 2, p. 67).

            30.             In August or September 2010, after entry into a settlement agreement with the former landlord of Sager, Savage, & Finete, Savage Finete executed a lease and relocated to the same suite that the law firm Sager, Savage, & Finete had previously leased, which location is one of the subject locations of this mail dispute, namely 5152 Kitella Avenue, Suite 104, Las Alamitos, California (Tr., Vol. 1, pp. 80-82; Savage Exh. 3).

            31.             On September 15, 2010, Disputant Sager executed a 2009 federal income tax return on behalf of Sager, Savage & Finete as the corporation’s President (Tr., Vol. 2, p. 111).

            32.             As of the hearing date, Sager, Savage, & Finete remains a professional law corporation in good standing under records maintained by the California Secretary of State and Disputant Sager is listed as the corporation’s President (Sager Exh. 4).

DECISION

           Postal Service regulations provide that in any dispute regarding delivery of mail to corporate entities, mail “must be delivered according to the order of the organization’s president or equivalent official.”  POM §614.1.  The parties in this dispute agree that prior to January 21, 2010, Disputant Sager served as President of Sager, Savage, & Finete (Finding 5).  It is also uncontested that Disputant Sager is currently listed as President of the corporation in records maintained by the Secretary of State (Finding 32; Sager Exh. 4).  Nevertheless, Disputant Savage sets forth three separate arguments that contest Disputant Sager’s current status as President of the corporation.[4]

           First, Disputant Savage contends that as the result of Disputant Sager’s breach of fiduciary duty to the corporation, he no longer maintains his role as President.  Second, Disputant Savage maintains that Disputant Sager abandoned his position as President on January 21, 2010.  Third, Disputant Savage argues that Disputant Sager resigned his position as President and/or Director of Sager, Savage & Finete in an electronic mail message sent to Disputant Savage on February 4, 2010.  In each instance, Disputant Savage argues that as Vice-President of the corporation, or as the corporation’s de facto President, she occupies a position that is “President or equivalent official” within the meaning of Postal Service regulations.[5]

I.          MAIL DISPUTE LOCATION:  5152 KITELLA AVENUE, SUITE 104, LAS       ALAMITOS, CALIFORNIA

            A.        Breach of Fiduciary Duty

           The parties in this matter are involved in civil litigation before the Superior Court of the State of California in a matter entitled Savage v. Sager, et al., Case No. 30-2010 00352578 (Sup. Ct. Orange County).  In the Superior Court litigation, the parties make numerous allegations regarding various actions that both parties contend, inter alia, resulted in breaches of fiduciary duty to the corporation.  Throughout the hearing in this mail dispute, multiple accusations were made regarding misappropriation and misuse of corporate funds by Disputant Sager from various witnesses called by Disputant Savage.  For his part, Disputant Sager testified to similar abuses by Disputant Savage.  There was lengthy and sometimes conflicting testimony by both parties regarding the other party’s practices in the personal use of corporate funds.

           However, both parties were reluctant to introduce corroborating evidence to support the allegations in the form of tax returns, forensic accounting records, or other documentary evidence that might support the proffered testimony.  At one point during the hearing, counsel for both parties expressed concern that any lengthy or protracted presentation of the specific details of such allegations would interfere with the ongoing Superior Court litigation (Tr., Vol. 2, pp. 81-82).  Accordingly, the evidence presented by both parties regarding allegations of corporate malfeasance and breach of fiduciary duty was limited, and amounted largely to unsubstantiated allegations about each party’s conduct with little or no documentary support. 

           Based on this incomplete record, I cannot find sufficient evidence to conclude that either party’s actions constitute a breach of their fiduciary duty to the corporation.  Without evidence of the details of these activities, the record is simply insufficient to reach a conclusion.  The specific allegations regarding each party’s misconduct are currently the subject of the Superior Court action, and they are best resolved in that forum.  As such, I decline to make factual findings on the issue of breach of fiduciary duty.[6]

            B.        Abandonment of the Position of Officer or Director by                                                     Disputant Sager

           Citing the bylaws of the corporation, Disputant Savage maintains that the actions of Disputant Sager after January 21, 2010, including his inactivity with respect to the day-to-day affairs of the law firm, constitute abandonment of his position under California corporation law (Tr. Vol. 1, pp. 143-144).  The corporation’s bylaws state as follows:

Section 5.  Vacancies in Office

           A vacancy in any office because of death, resignation, removal, disqualification or any other cause shall be filled in the manner prescribed in these Bylaws for regular appointments to that office (Sager Exh. 7).

           Under California law, abandonment -- frequently referred to as constructive resignation -- is generally applied to positions held by individuals in municipal corporations.  See Cal. Gov’t. Code § 1770 (West 2011); 52 Cal. Jur. 3d Public Officers and Employees §115; see also, Walter v. Adams, 243 P.2d 21, 24 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1952)(city judge abandoned public office).  While Disputant Sager’s absence from the daily affairs of Sager, Savage & Finete after January 21, 2010, is not in dispute, there is considerable dispute as to the legal implications of that absence. 

            Even if I were to find that an abandonment of the position has occurred, as Disputant Savage argues, the parties have not provided, nor have I uncovered any case law in California that applies the principle of abandonment or constructive resignation to the situation at hand in a private corporation.  I therefore decline to adopt this theory in the absence of legal precedent in the State of California that would support its application on these facts.  Accordingly, I make no finding in this case regarding abandonment or constructive resignation of the corporate office(s) held by Disputant Sager.

            C.        Resignation by Disputant Sager of Position as                                                                Director or Officer

           Disputant Savage relies upon an electronic mail communication from Disputant Sager dated February 4, 2010, which she contends is a written resignation of his office (Savage Exh. 4; Tr., Vol. 1, p. 129 ).  The electronic mail states, in pertinent part, “in the end I want you and only you to have the firm.”  (Finding 10).  Disputant Sager denies that the intent of the electronic mail was to resign his position as an officer or director of the corporation.  Disputant Sager testified that the intent of the electronic mail was to reach out to Disputant Savage in an effort to resolve their differences (Tr., Vol. 2., pp. 39-40).

           While Disputant Savage argues in her closing brief that a formal written resignation is unnecessary, California Corporate Code §305(d) suggests that a written notice is required, at least with respect to the resignation of a director.  The code also recognizes that an electronic mail message may suffice as a writing.  Cal. Corp. Code §§20 and 195 (West 2011).  Thus if the electronic mail is a resignation, it would appear to satisfy the writing requirement of §305.  However, the code is silent on what content is necessary to effectuate a resignation letter. 

           In Dillon v. Berg, 326 F. Supp. 1214 (D. Del. 1971), a federal court interpreting a similar provision of Delaware corporate law concluded that “it can also be inferred . . .  that a resignation be unequivocal, in writing, and that it be communicated to the corporation.”  Assuming that the electronic mail meets the requirements of a writing under §305, and the electronic mail to Disputant Savage also constitutes a communication “to the corporation,” the question remains whether the resignation was unequivocal.  What constitutes a resignation, particularly where the content of the communication at issue is ambiguous, is a question of fact.  There is no quarrel that nowhere in the electronic mail communication does Disputant Sager mention the word “resign” or any similar term.  The communication never offers a date for separation, nor any language traditionally used to convey intent to terminate employment, other than the ambiguously phrased terminology quoted above. 

           Disputant Savage argues that the tone of the communication appears to have Disputant Sager requesting Disputant Savage’s permission to continue working on a case.  Disputant Savage argues that in doing so, Disputant Sager is evidencing his belief that Disputant Savage is the President of the corporation.  While I acknowledge that the tone of the electronic mail is conciliatory and at times solicitous, it does not appear to be recognition of Disputant Savage as President.  It is a stretch to read into this communication the legal conclusions that Disputant Savage argues should apply here.  A plain reading of the electronic mail does not reflect an intent by Disputant Sager to convey his resignation as an officer or director of the corporation. 

           Likewise, the actions of Disputant Sager during this same time period, as well as immediately after delivery of the electronic mail, do not support an interpretation that he intended to resign his position as an officer or director of the corporation in the cited electronic mail.  After the date of this electronic mail, despite Disputant Sager’s absence from the law firm, both parties engaged in mediation in an attempt to resolve their differences.  There was testimony that offers and counteroffers were made regarding the purchase of Disputant Sager’s ownership interest in the corporation.  In addition, as late as September 2010, well after the date of the electronic mail, Disputant Sager executed the 2009 federal income tax return for the corporation as its President (Finding 31). 

           Although Disputant Sager surrendered day-to-day management of the firm to Disputant Savage after January 21, 2010, and the corporation largely ceased to conduct business after March 10, 2010, Disputant Sager maintained an interest in the financial activity of the firm.  Insofar as he continued to act as an owner and officer of the law firm after the date of this electronic mail communication, including participation in mediation regarding the future of the firm, negotiating client checks, opening corporate bank accounts, expending corporate funds, engaging in litigation, and furthering his personal financial interests as an owner, I cannot reasonably conclude that he did so after a knowing and intentional resignation of his position as a director or officer of the corporation.[7]

           In so finding, I also acknowledge that Disputant Savage may well be the de facto President of the corporation as she maintains.  “A de facto officer of a private corporation is defined as being one who has the reputation of being the officer [she] assumes to be in the exercise of the functions of the office, and yet is not a good officer in point of law.”  John Paul Lumber Co. v. Agnew, 270 P.2d 1044, 1048 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1954).  Traditionally, the issue with respect to a de facto officer of a private corporation arises in the dealings of the corporation with third parties.  Specifically, the doctrine exists “’as a matter of policy and necessity’ to provide stability and certainty in public and private transactions and to protect innocent third parties who engage in business with a public or corporate officer who presents himself or herself as having the appropriate authority.”  Platypus Wear, Inc. v. Cahill, No. D046020, 2006 WL 281117 at *7 (Cal. Ct. App., February 7, 2006), quoting Oakland Paving Co. v. Donovan, 126 P. 388, 390 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1912). 

           When applied to a situation in which the issues are strictly internal to the corporation, such as a disputed corporate office, the de facto label has little import, as interested internal parties, including officers and directors, can be presumed to know the de jure officers of the corporation.  See, e.g., Dillon v. Scott, Dillon Co., 335 F.Supp 566 (D. Del. 1971)(“the de facto directors' doctrine does not apply when there is a direct challenge to a disputed office.”)  Under California corporate law, I found no support for the argument that the existence of a de facto President replaces the position of the de jure President, and none was provided to me by Disputant Savage. 

           Thus, for third parties, and perhaps even for existing employees at that time, Disputant Savage may have been perceived as de facto President of the corporation after January 21, 2010.  However, in the absence of an action by the Board of Directors appointing her to the position, she fails to obtain the status of de jure President; a position occupied at all relevant times by Disputant Sager.  See, Cal. Corp. Code §§301, 305 (West 2011); Sager Exh. 7 (By-Laws of Sager & Savage, Article V); see, e.g., Beraksa v. Stardust Records, Inc., 30 Cal.Rptr. 504, 508 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1963)(solitary exercise of power insufficient to establish individual as de facto president).  While Postal Service regulations do provide for the recognition of an “equivalent official” to the President of a corporation for the purpose of directing delivery of the mail, a de facto President under California law cannot be found to be an “equivalent official” on this record, particularly when the de jure President remains an interested party.[8]

           Accordingly, I find that Disputant Savage is not “President or equivalent official” under California law as the term is used in Postal Service regulations.  As the de jure President of the corporation has been neither removed by the Board nor has he resigned his position, Disputant Sager maintains authority as President of the corporation to direct delivery of the mail addressed to the corporation under POM §614.1 at 5152 Kitella Avenue, Suite 104, Las Alamitos, California 90720-2841.  See, e.g., Edwin J. Kirschner and Elaine Cartechine & Virginia Blanchard, P.S. Docket No. MD 98-39 (I.D. March 23, 1998)(evidence failed to prove that president was removed from office in accordance with bylaws, articles of incorporation, or Florida statutes, thus he remains president to direct delivery of mail under Postal Service regulations).

II.                   MAIL DISPUTE LOCATION:  P.O. BOX 5849, GARDEN GROVE,

      CALIFORNIA 92846-0849

           There was no evidence in the record that Disputant Sager had any connection to the post office box that was created by representatives of Savage Finete in Garden Grove, California.  Nevertheless, Disputant Sager maintains that if mail delivered at that address is labeled to Sager & Savage, or Sager, Savage, & Finete, then he should direct delivery of that mail as President of the corporation.  However, unlike Suite 104, there is nothing in the record that P.O. Box 5849 has any relationship to the law firm Sager, Savage, & Finete or its predecessor Sager & Savage.  Indeed, Disputant Sager seemed unaware of its existence prior to this mail dispute (Tr., Vol. 2, p. 121).  There was no evidence introduced by Disputant Sager that the law firm Sager, Savage, & Finete sought to open this post office box, or that its corporate funds were used to pay the fees associated with the post office box.  In fact, there was no evidence that Sager, Savage, & Finete had any relationship to this address at any time prior to or during this dispute. 

           Disputant Savage testified that the post office box was opened on behalf of the law firm Savage Finete (Finding 15).  Any client sending mail to this disputed post office box would, by necessity, have needed to obtain the address from Savage Finete, presumably at the time they executed their change of counsel forms, as the address itself did not exist in connection with Sager, Savage & Finete.  As current clients or vendors of Savage Finete, they would utilize the address given to them by the law firm, or the address that appears on the law firm’s stationary.  Thus, I find it is highly likely to be the sender’s intent that the mail addressed to the disputed post office box reach Savage Finete, even if the sender misaddressed the mail to include the name Sager, or if they misaddressed the mail to the predecessor law firm’s name.  See, e.g., Doris E. Shyda and Sigmund Shyda Jr., P.S. Docket No. MD 05-58 (I.D. May 26, 2005)(“One of the principles governing resolution of mail disputes is that mail should be delivered as intended by the senders.”)  Accordingly, mail addressed to P.O. Box 5849 should be delivered as addressed, or as directed by the President of Savage Finete. 

CONCLUSION

           The Judicial Officer should issue an Order to the Las Alamitos, California postmaster that the disputed mail addressed to Sager, Savage, & Finete or Sager & Savage or to Daniel Sager at 5152 Kitella Avenue, Suite 104, Las Alamitos, California 90720-2841 be delivered as directed by Disputant Sager.[9]  All other mail to this address that does not contain the above addressees shall be delivered as addressed.

           The Judicial Officer should issue an Order to the Garden Grove, California postmaster that the disputed mail addressed to P.O. Box 5849, Garden Grove, California 92846-0849 shall be delivered as addressed, or as directed by the President of Savage Finete. 

           This decision deals only with delivery of mail.  It does not determine ownership of the contents of the mail and does not attempt to resolve any underlying disputes between the parties.

James G. Gilbert                       
Chief Administrative Law Judge

[1] Although the transmittal letter from Postal Service counsel referred only to the 5152 Kitella Avenue, Suite 104, Las Alamitos, California address, both parties agreed to submit the P.O. Box 5849, Garden Grove, California 92846-0849 dispute to this forum for resolution in this mail dispute and I exercised my discretion to accept the additional location involving the same parties in the interests of judicial economy (Savage Exh. 7)(Tr., Vol. 1, pp. 5-7).  See 39 C.F.R. §965.4(b)(1).

[2] Citations to exhibits admitted into the record are abbreviated to “Sager Exh.” or “Savage Exh.”

[3] Citations to the hearing transcript and page number appear as “Tr., Vol. __, p.__.” 

[4] We look to the law of the state where the corporation is domiciled to guide us in our interpretation of “president or equivalent official.”  Tom Moore and Joseph Bridges, P.S. Docket No. MD 07-244 (I.D. December 28, 2009).  In this case, it is not disputed that California law applies to the resolution of these issues.  

[5] It was unclear from the record whether Disputant Savage actually holds the position of Vice-President of the corporation, as the records appear to indicate that the office is vacant.  In a promotional brochure for the law firm, Disputant Savage is identified as Vice-President.  However, because of the decision that follows, it is unnecessary to make any finding on whether she holds that office.

[6] I also note that in post trial briefs filed by both parties, neither party presents any argument on the legal issue raised that might make such factual findings on the allegations relevant to this mail dispute.  That legal issue is whether a breach of fiduciary duty by an officer or director of a corporation is grounds for removal of that officer or director outside of statutory procedures for removal or replacement set forth in the California Corporate Code.  Because I decline to make factual findings on the issue of breach of fiduciary duty, I need not reach this legal issue originally raised by Disputant Savage.  I express no view whether a demonstrated breach of fiduciary duty by the president of a corporation, in the absence of a removal by the board of directors or a state court, would be grounds to disregard the POM direction that the corporation’s president controls delivery of the mail.   

[7] Whether such conduct was proper or lawful is not before me in this forum.  I look only to the actions of the participants to divine the intent of the parties with respect to the issue of resignation.  I make no finding about the propriety or legality of Disputant Sager’s actions involving the corporation after January 21, 2010.

[8] It is important to note that Disputant Savage was not without her remedies to address the issue of Disputant Sager’s continued occupation of the position of de jure President and director despite his absence from the law firm.  California Corporate Code provides for application to the Superior Court for the appointment of a provisional director when, as here, an election for an office would leave the Board evenly divided.  Cal. Corp. Code §308 (West 2011).  Likewise, Disputant Savage could have opted for injunctive relief through the California courts that might have permitted her to direct delivery of the mail notwithstanding Disputant Sager’s position as President of the corporation.  An order from a court of competent jurisdiction regarding delivery of disputed mail is recognized by the United States Postal Service notwithstanding the provisions of POM §616.21.  See POM §616.3.  That Disputant Savage chose not to seek these judicial remedies is her decision, but the limited review in a mail dispute under POM §616.21 and 39 C.F.R. Part 965 does not permit me to offer such equitable or statutory remedies in this forum. 

[9] This decision does not determine who should be operating the business of the corporation or who is entitled to the contents of the mail.  If Disputant Sager receives mail intended for other persons or entities receiving mail at the disputed address, he is to forward that mail to the appropriate party.  See, e.g., Abraham Hirschfield and David Rosenberg, P. S. Docket No. MD 00-298 (I.D. October 19, 2000).