March 20, 2018

In the Matter of the Debt Collection Act Petition

SARAH D. ANAYA v. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS

P.S. Docket No. VA 17-145

APPEARANCE FOR PETITIONER:
Sarah Anaya, pro se

APPEARANCE FOR RESPONDENT:
Kelly Burns, Esq.
National Practice Group, Collections

FINAL DECISION UNDER THE DEBT COLLECTION ACT OF 1982

This matter is before me on cross-motions for summary judgment.  The Court will grant summary judgment when the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  My function at the summary judgment stage is not to weigh the evidence, but rather to determine whether there are genuine questions of fact for trial. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986).  If the evidence and pleadings demonstrate that only questions of law are at issue, summary judgment is the proper method to resolve a case without a hearing. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Maghan v. Bd. of Comm'rs of D.C., 141 F.2d 274, 275 (D.C. Cir. 1944).  Here, Petitioner does not contest the amount of the debt.  Rather, the parties disagree on the interpretation of a Continued Service Agreement executed by Petitioner prior to her departure from the agency.  Therefore, it is appropriate to resolve this case by summary judgment.  Along with their summary judgment motions, the parties submitted a Joint Stipulation of Facts, relevant portions of which are included below.

FACTS NOT IN DISPUTE

1. Ms. Anaya was a member of the 2015 cohort for the VA Acquisition Academy Acquisition Intern Program (“AIP”) (Joint Stipulation, ¶1).
2. The 2015 AIP cohort had four blocks of training (Joint Stipulation, ¶2).
3. AIP interns sign a Continued Service Agreement (“CSA”) prior to beginning training (Joint Stipulation, ¶3).
4. Ms. Anaya initialed and signed her CSA on June 11, 2013, prior to beginning training (Joint Stipulation, ¶4; AE-2).¹
5. Ms. Anaya attended the first three training blocks of the 2015 cohort (Joint Stipulation, ¶6).
6. The third training block was held in Frederick, Maryland from October 6, 2014, through November 21, 2014 (Joint Stipulation, ¶7).
7. VA paid for Ms. Anaya’s travel expenses for the third training block, including airfare, hotel accommodations, daily meals and incidental expenses, and other miscellaneous expenses, such as baggage and laundry fees (Joint Stipulation, ¶8).
8. VA paid training costs on Ms. Anaya’s behalf for the third training block, including administration, instruction, and curriculum (Joint Stipulation, ¶9).
9. On April 23, 2015, Ms. Anaya notified VA that she decided to pursue a career opportunity elsewhere and had a tentative start date of May 17, 2015 (Joint Stipulation, ¶10).
10. On May 1, 2015, Division Chief Sean Warner advised Ms. Anaya that she would be required to reimburse VA for travel costs and training costs associated with her early departure from AIP and VA (Joint Stipulation, ¶11).
11. On May 6, 2015, Director of Contracting Samuel Harbin informed Ms. Anaya that her service obligation would not be transferred to the gaining agency and VA intended to seek reimbursement in the amount of $22,419.68 (Joint Stipulation, ¶12).
12. Ms. Anaya voluntarily separated from VA in May 2015 (Joint Stipulation, ¶13).
13. VHA Service Center issued a Notice of Indebtedness (“Notice”) to Ms. Anaya on July 10, 2015 (Joint Stipulation, ¶14).
14. The Notice stated that VA intended to collect $7,207.24 for travel costs and $15,212.44 for training costs.  The $7,207.24 figure represents actual travel costs for the third block of training, including $4,109.14 for travel costs between October 5, 2014, and October 31, 2014, and $3,098.10 for travel costs between November 1, 2014, and November 21, 2014.  The $15,212.44 figure represents training costs, including $5,509.50 for general and administrative costs, $4,069.17 for Acquisition Internship School administration costs, and $5,633.77 for AIP curriculum and support contracts costs.  (Joint Stipulation, ¶15).
15. On August 6, 2015, Ms. Anaya requested an appeal regarding the debt.² On August 25, 2015, she submitted to VA a Petition for a Hearing under the Debt Collection Act with a Non-Veterans Affairs Official.  (Joint Stipulation, ¶17).³

DISCUSSION

The agency moves for summary judgment on the grounds that Petitioner separated from the agency prior to completion of her obligated service under the CSA, and that the plain language of the CSA permits collection of expenses associated with her training.  Petitioner moves on the grounds that the CSA should be interpreted in an alternative manner that would allow her to violate its terms but not be held liable for any damages.
Continued service agreements of the type executed by Petitioner are governed by 5 U.S.C. § 4108.  Congress delegated to the agencies the authority to enter into CSAs for reimbursement of training expenses if an employee leaves agency employment prior to the completion of his or her obligated period of service.  Based on this delegation of authority, the VA and Petitioner entered into a CSA.
To determine the parties’ obligations under the contract, I begin by reviewing the plain language of the CSA.  Kline v. United States Postal Service, AO 17-98, 2018 WL 1362943 (I.D. January 23, 2018); Joseph Anzalone, AO 13-378, 2014 WL 12767825 (I.D. May 15, 2014), aff’d, 2015 WL 13647609 (P.S.D. March 9, 2015).  Paragraph 1 sets forth the agreement that Petitioner will remain with the VA for three years.  Paragraph 2 delineates the period of obligated service as August 6, 2015, through August 5, 2018.  Paragraph 3 sets forth the conditions under which Petitioner must repay her obligation should she leave both agency and federal service during the obligated period.  However, as Petitioner transferred to another federal agency, it is Paragraph 4 of the agreement that delineates her obligations.
I FURTHER AGREE that if I voluntarily leave VA to enter the service of another Federal agency or other organization in any branch of the Government before completing the period of service agreed to in Item #1 and #2 above, I will give the VA Acquisition Academy Acquisition Internship School Vice-Chancellor at least 30 calendar days advance written notice during which time a determination will be made concerning reimbursement or transfer of the remaining service obligation to the gaining agency. If I fail to give this advance notice, I AGREE to reimburse VA under the same terms as Item #3 above. I understand that if there is a transfer of my service obligation to another federal agency or other organization in any branch of the Government, the agreements will remain in effect until I have completed my obligated service with that other agency.
AE-2, ¶4 (emphasis added).
Paragraph 4 refers back to Paragraph 3 for the terms of collection in the event the employee fails to give the notice required under the agreement.
If I voluntarily leave VA and the Federal service before completing the period of service agreed to in items #1 and #2 above, I AGREE to reimburse VA for all costs (excluding salary and benefits) of tuition/fees/materials/books, equipment, indirect costs, and travel related expenses paid in connection with my training. The amount of the reimbursement will be reduced on a pro rata basis for the percentage of completion of the obligated service. (For example, if the cost of the training is determined to be $5000 and I complete one-half of the obligated service, I will reimburse VA $2500 instead of the original $5000).
AE-2, ¶3 (emphasis added)
Petitioner generally argues that the relevant provisions are ambiguous, and as applied to her are therefore unenforceable.  However, I find no ambiguity in the contract language.  The CSA is a relatively straightforward agreement.  The employee agreed to continue in service to the agency for three years following completion of the training, or otherwise would be subject to reimbursement provisions of the contract.  Petitioner concedes that she did not meet the service obligations of the CSA when she voluntarily separated from the agency in May 2015. 
Petitioner argues that she did not successfully complete the full AIP prior to her departure from the agency, therefore the terms of the CSA are not enforceable.  This argument misreads the plain language of the contract.   
I AGREE that, on successful completion of VA Acquisition Academy Intern training, I will serve in the Department of Veterans Affairs for a period of three years. I also understand that if I depart from the program prior to completion than (sic) my obligation is prorated based on the time in the program and costs incurred.
AE-2, ¶1 (emphasis added).
The second sentence of Paragraph 1 of the CSA clearly modifies the first, recognizing that employees may leave the program prior to completion of their training.  It provides that in the event that they do not successfully complete the AIP training, the reimbursement will be appropriately pro-rated.  As Petitioner admits she separated from the agency prior to completion of the program, she is responsible for a pro-rata share of the expenses. 
Petitioner next argues that her voluntary separation was to another federal agency, thus the CSA is unenforceable by its terms.  However, this is not what the CSA or the governing statute says.  Rather, the CSA envisions that an employee may transfer to another federal agency, and provides specific provisions for the employee to follow regarding proper notice to the agency. 
I FURTHER AGREE that if I voluntarily leave VA to enter the service of another Federal agency or other organization in any branch of the Government before completing the period of service agreed to In Item #1 and #2 above, I will give the VA Acquisition Academy Acquisition Internship School Vice-Chancellor at least 30 calendar days advance written notice during which time a determination will be made concerning reimbursement or transfer of the remaining service obligation to the gaining agency. If I fail to give this advance notice, I AGREE to reimburse VA under the same terms as Item #3 above. I understand that if there is a transfer of my service obligation to another federal agency or other organization in any branch of the Government, the agreements will remain In effect until I have completed my obligated service with that other agency.
AE-2, ¶4 (emphasis added).
Petitioner failed to give the agency the thirty days’ notice contemplated by the contract.  The purpose of the notice provision is to give the agency time to consider whether the service obligation can or should be transferred to the gaining agency.  See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. §4108(b).  The parties agree that Petitioner did not give the notice required under the agreement.
Further, even if Petitioner did give the required notice, the agency is under no contractual or statutory obligation to enter into a transfer agreement with the gaining agency.  The statute provides that if the agency “notifies the employee before the effective date of his entrance into the service of the other agency that payment will be required under this section” the agency may collect the debt notwithstanding the employee’s transfer within federal service.  Id.  The agency notified Petitioner on May 6, 2015, that there would not be a transfer of her service obligation to the gaining agency.  This notice gave Petitioner time to reconsider her decision to leave the agency, and it permits the agency to proceed with collection should she leave.  Id. 
In the end, the plain language of the CSA leaves little room for misunderstanding or misinterpretation.  I find that Petitioner’s arguments are insufficient to meet her burden of persuasion on summary judgment.
I further find that the agency’s submission of its damages brief, which Petitioner does not contest, adequately proves that the total owed by Petitioner is $22,419.68, including $7,207.24 for travel plus $15,212.44 for training.  Accordingly, the agency is entitled to judgment in its favor.
Petitioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.
Respondent’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

ORDER

The Petition is DENIED.  The agency may collect the debt of $22,419.68 by administrative salary offset.

James G. Gilbert
Chief Administrative Law Judge